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Bipartite and multipartite entangled states are of central interest in quantum information pro-
cessing and foundational studies. Efficient verification of these states, especially in the adversarial
scenario, is a key to various applications, including quantum computation, quantum simulation,
and quantum networks. However, little is know about this topic in the adversarial scenario. Here
we initiate a systematic study of pure-state verification in the adversarial scenario. In particular,
we introduce a general method for determining the minimal number of tests required by a given
strategy to achieve a given precision. In the case of homogeneous strategies, we can even derive
an analytical formula. Furthermore, we propose a general recipe to verifying pure quantum states
in the adversarial scenario by virtue of protocols for the nonadversarial scenario. Thanks to this
recipe, the resource cost for verifying an arbitrary pure state in the adversarial scenario is compa-
rable to the counterpart for the nonadversarial scenario, and the overhead is at most three times
for high-precision verification. Our recipe can readily be applied to efficiently verify bipartite pure
states, stabilizer states, hypergraph states, weighted graph states, and Dicke states in the adversarial
scenario. This paper is an extended version of the companion paper [1].
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum states encode all the information about a
quantum system and play a central role in quantum in-
formation processing. For example, bipartite entangled
states, especially maximally entangled states, are crucial
to quantum teleportation, dense coding, and quantum
cryptography [2, 3]. Multipartite entangled states, such
as graph states [4] and hypergraph states [5–9] are es-
pecially useful in (blind) measurement-based quantum
computation (MBQC) [10–20], quantum error correc-
tion [21, 22], quantum networks [23–25], and foundation
studies [26–29]. Another important class of multipartite
states, including Dicke states [30, 31], are useful in quan-
tum metrology [32]. Furthermore, multipartite states,
such as tensor-network states, also have extensive appli-
cations in research areas beyond quantum information
science, including condensed matter physics [33, 34].
To unleash the potential of multipartite quan-
tum states in quantum information processing, it is
paramount to prepare and verify these states with high
precision using limited resources. To verify quantum
states with traditional tomography [35], however, the re-
source required increases exponentially with the number
of qubits. Although compressed sensing [36] and direct
fidelity estimation (DFE) [37] can improve the efficiency,
the scaling behavior cannot be changed in general. As
another alternative, self-testing [16, 38, 39] is also quite
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resource consuming although it is conceptually appealing
from the perspective of device independence.
Recently, a powerful approach known as quantum state
verification (QSV) has attracted increasing attention [40–
42]. Efficient verification protocols have been constructed
for bipartite pure states [40, 41, 43–46], Greenberger-
Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) states [47], stabilizer states (in-
cluding graph states) [14–16, 25, 42], hypergraph states
[48], weighted graph states [49], and Dicke states [50].
By contrast, the situation is more troublesome when we
turn to the adversarial scenario, in which the quantum
states of interest are controlled by an untrusted party,
Eve. Efficient QSV in such adversarial scenario is crucial
to many applications in quantum information process-
ing that require high security conditions, including blind
MBQC [13–17] and quantum networks [23–25]. Unfor-
tunately, no efficient approach is known for addressing
such adversarial scenario in general. For example, to
verify the simplest nontrivial hypergraph states (say of
three qubits) already requires an astronomical number
of measurements [19, 51]. What is worse, little is known
about the resource cost of a given verification strategy to
achieve a given precision [51, 52]. As a consequence, no
general guideline is known for constructing an efficient
verification strategy or for comparing the efficiencies of
different strategies.
In this paper we initiate a systematic study of pure-
state verification in the adversarial scenario. In particu-
lar, we introduce a general method for determining the
minimal number of tests required by a given verification
strategy to achieve a given precision. We also introduce
2the concept of homogeneous strategies, which play a key
role in QSV. Thanks to their high symmetry, we can
derive analytical formulas for most figures of merit of
practical interest. The conditions for single-copy verifi-
cation are also clarified. Furthermore, we provide a gen-
eral recipe to constructing efficient verification protocols
for the adversarial scenario from verification protocols for
the nonadversarial scenario. By virtue of this recipe, we
can verify pure quantum states in the adversarial scenario
with nearly the same efficiency as in the nonadversarial
scenario. For high-precision verification, the overhead in
the number of tests is at most three times. In this way,
pure-state verification in the adversarial scenario can be
greatly simplified since it suffices to focus on the non-
adversarial scenario and then apply our recipe. In ad-
dition, our study reveals that entangling measurements
are less helpful and often unnecessary in improving the
verification efficiency in the adversarial scenario, which
is counterintuitive at first sight1.
Our work is especially helpful to the verification of bi-
partite pure states [40, 41, 43–46], GHZ states [47], stabi-
lizer states (including graph states) [42, 48], hypergraph
states [48], weighted graph states [49], and Dicke states
[50], for which efficient verification protocols for the non-
adversarial scenario have been constructed recently. By
virtue of our recipe, all these states can be verified in the
adversarial scenario with much higher efficiencies than
was possible previously. For bipartite pure states, even
optimal protocols can be constructed.
This paper is an extended version of the companion
paper [1].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II,
we review the basic framework of QSV in the nonadver-
sarial scenario. In Sec. III, we clarify the limitations of
previous approaches to QSV and motivate the current
study. In Sec. IV, we formulate the general ideal of QSV
in the adversarial scenario and introduce the main figures
of merit. In Sec. V, we introduce a general method for
computing the main figures of merit in the adversarial
scenario. In Sec. VI, we discuss in detail QSV with ho-
mogeneous strategies. In Sec. VII, we clarify the power
of a single test in QSV. In Sec. VIII, we determine the
minimal number of tests required by a general verifica-
tion strategy to achieve a given precision. In Sec. IX, we
propose a general recipe to constructing efficient verifi-
cation protocols for the adversarial scenario from proto-
cols devised for the nonadversarial scenario. In Sec. X,
we demonstrate the power of our recipe via its applica-
tions to many important bipartite and multipartite quan-
tum states. In Sec. XI, we compare QSV with a number
1 This work was originally motivated by the verification of hyper-
graph states and is contained as a part of the paper Ref. [48].
However, the general framework of QSV in the adversarial sce-
nario we developed applies to all pure states, not only to hyper-
graph states. To discuss this topic comprehensively, we finally
decided to write an independent and self-contained paper.
of other approaches for estimating or verifying quantum
states. Section XII summarizes this paper. To stream-
line the presentation, most technical proofs are relegated
to the appendix.
II. SETTING THE STAGE
In this section we first review the basic framework of
QSV in the nonadversarial scenario. The main results
presented here were established by Pallister, Linden, and
Montanaro (PLM) [42], but we have simplified the deriva-
tion. These results will serve as a benchmark for un-
derstanding pure-state verification in the adversarial sce-
nario, which is the main focus of this paper. Then we
discuss the connection between QSV and fidelity estima-
tion.
A. Verification of pure states: Nonadversarial
scenario
Consider a device that is supposed to produce the
target state |Ψ〉 in the (generally multipartite) Hilbert
space H. In practice, the device may actually produce
σ1, σ2, . . . , σN in N runs. Following Ref. [42], here we
assume that the fidelity 〈Ψ|σj |Ψ〉 either equals 1 for all
j or satisfies 〈Ψ|σj |Ψ〉 ≤ 1 − ǫ for all j (the limitation
of this assumption will be analyzed in Sec. III). Now the
task is to determine which is the case.
To achieve this task we can perform N tests and ac-
cept the states produced if and only if (iff) all tests are
passed. Each test is specified by a two-outcome measure-
ment {El, 1−El} chosen randomly from a set of accessi-
ble measurements. The test operator El corresponds to
passing the test. We assume that the target state |Ψ〉 can
always pass the test, that is, El|Ψ〉 = |Ψ〉 for each El. A
verification strategy is characterized by all the tests El
and the probabilities µl for performing these tests.
To determine the maximal probability of failing to re-
ject the bad case, it is convenient to introduce the verifi-
cation operator Ω :=
∑
l µlEl. As we shall see later, most
key properties of a verification strategy is determined by
the verification operator Ω, irrespective of how the test
operators are constructed. Therefore, Ω is also referred
to as a strategy when there is no danger of confusion. By
construction, the target state |Ψ〉 is an eigenstate of Ω
with the largest eigenvalue 1. When 〈Ψ|σj |Ψ〉 ≤ 1−ǫ, by
contrast, the maximal probability that σj can pass a test
on average is given by [42] (see Appendix A for a simple
derivation)
max
〈Ψ|σ|Ψ〉≤1−ǫ
tr(Ωσ) = 1− [1− β(Ω)]ǫ = 1− ν(Ω)ǫ, (1)
where the maximization in the left hand side runs over
all quantum states σ that satisfy the fidelity constraint
〈Ψ|σ|Ψ〉 ≤ 1 − ǫ. Here β(Ω) is the second largest
3eigenvalue of Ω, and ν(Ω) := 1 − β(Ω) is the spec-
tral gap from the maximal eigenvalue. Note that β(Ω)
is equal to the operator norm of Ω − |Ψ〉〈Ψ|, that is,
β(Ω) = ‖Ω− |Ψ〉〈Ψ|‖.
After N runs, σj in the bad case can pass all tests
with probability at most [1 − ν(Ω)ǫ]N . This is also the
maximal probability that the verification strategy fails
to detect the bad case. To achieve significance level δ
(confidence level 1 − δ), that is, [1 − ν(Ω)ǫ]N ≤ δ, the
minimum number of tests is given by [42]
NNA(ǫ, δ,Ω)=
⌈
1
ln[1− ν(Ω)ǫ] ln δ
⌉
≤
⌈
1
ν(Ω)ǫ
ln
1
δ
⌉
. (2)
This number is the main figure of merit of concern in
QSV because to a large extent it determines the resource
costs of implementing the verification strategy Ω. Note
that a single test is sufficient if
ν(Ω)ǫ+ δ ≥ 1. (3)
According to Eq. (2), the efficiency of the strategy Ω
is determined by the spectral gap ν(Ω). The optimal
protocol is obtained by maximizing the spectral gap ν(Ω).
If there is no restriction on the accessible measurements,
then the optimal protocol is composed of the projective
measurement {|Ψ〉〈Ψ|, 1−|Ψ〉〈Ψ|}, in which case we have
Ω = |Ψ〉〈Ψ| and ν(Ω) = 1, so that
NNA(ǫ, δ,Ω)=
⌈
1
ln(1− ǫ) ln δ
⌉
≤
⌈
1
ǫ
ln
1
δ
⌉
. (4)
In addition, the requirement in Eq. (3) reduces to
ǫ+ δ ≥ 1. (5)
This efficiency cannot be improved further even if we
can perform collective measurements. In particular, the
scaling behaviors of ǫ−1 ln δ−1 with ǫ and δ are the best
we can expect.
In practice, quite often the target state |Ψ〉 is entan-
gled, but it is not easy to perform entangling measure-
ments. It is therefore crucial to devise efficient verifi-
cation protocols based on local operations and classical
communication (LOCC). Here by “efficient” we mean that
the protocols can be applied in practice with reasonable
resource costs, which is a much stronger requirement than
what is usually understood in computer science. Ideally,
the inverse spectral gap 1/ν(Ω) should be independent
of the system size (the number of qubits say) or grow no
faster than a low-order polynomial. In addition, the co-
efficients should be reasonably small. It turns out many
important quantum states in quantum information pro-
cessing can be verified efficiently with respect to these
stringent criteria. Besides the total number N of tests
determined by ǫ, δ, and ν(Ω), the number of potential
measurement settings is also of concern if it is difficult
to switch measurement settings. Nevertheless, most of
our results in Sec. II-IX are independent of the specific
details (including the number of potential measurement
settings) of a verification protocol once the verification
operator is fixed.
Here, we compare the approach presented above with
previous works Refs. [40, 41]. In mathematical statistics,
we often discuss hypothesis testing in the framework of
uniformly most powerful test among a certain class of
tests. In this case, we fix a certain set of states S0, and
impose to our test the condition that the probability of
erroneously rejecting states in S0 is upper bounded by a
certain value δ′ ≥ 0. Under this condition, we maximize
the probability of detecting a state σ in Sc. When a
test maximizes the probability uniformly for every state
σ in Sc, it is called a uniformly most powerful (UMP)
test. However, since the detecting probability depends
on the state σ, such a test does not exist in general.
In this paper, S0 and δ′ are chosen to be {|Ψ〉} and 0,
respectively. We consider the case in which the same
strategy Ω is applied N times. Since we support the
state |Ψ〉 only when all our outcomes correspond to the
pass eigenspace of Ω, our test is UMP under this case.
When the set S0 is chosen as {σ|〈Ψ|σ|Ψ〉 ≥ 1 − ǫ′},
and δ′ is a non-zero value, the problem is more com-
plicated. Such a setting arises when we allow a certain
amount of error. To resolve this problem, imposing a
certain symmetric condition to our tests, Refs. [40, 41]
discussed several optimization problems and investigated
their asymptotic behaviors when |Ψ〉 is a maximally en-
tangled state.
B. Connection with fidelity estimation
When all states σj are identical to σ, let F = 〈Ψ|σ|Ψ〉
be the fidelity between σ and the target state |Ψ〉; then
we have
[1− τ(Ω)]F + τ(Ω) ≤ tr(Ωσ) ≤ ν(Ω)F + β(Ω), (6)
where τ(Ω) is the smallest eigenvalue of Ω. Therefore,
1− tr(Ωσ) ≤ 1− tr(Ωσ)
1− τ(Ω) ≤ 1− F ≤
1− tr(Ωσ)
ν(Ω)
. (7)
So the passing probability tr(Ωσ) provides upper and
lower bounds for the infidelity (and fidelity). In general,
Eqs. (6) and (7) still hold if F and tr(Ωσ) are replaced
by the averages over all σj . Note that the inequalities in
Eqs. (6) and (7) are saturated when τ(Ω) = β(Ω); such
strategies are called homogeneous and are discussed in
more detail in Sec. VI. In this case we have
1− F = 1− tr(Ωσ)
ν(Ω)
, F =
tr(Ωσ)− β(Ω)
ν(Ω)
. (8)
So the fidelity with the target state can be estimated
from the passing probability. The standard deviation of
this estimation reads
∆F =
√
p(1− p)
ν
√
N
≤ 1
2ν
√
N
, (9)
4where p = tr(Ωσ) = νF + β ≥ F and N is the number
of tests performed. Note that this standard deviation
decreases monotonically with ν andN . This conclusion is
related to the testing of binomial distributions discussed
in Ref. [41]. When F ≥ 1/2, which is the case of most
interest, we also have
∆F =
√
p(1− p)
ν
√
N
≤
√
F (1− F )
ν
√
N
(10)
given that p ≥ F .
III. VERIFICATION OF PURE STATES: A
CRITICAL REEXAMINATION
In this section we reexamine the framework of QSV
proposed by PLM [42] as summarized in Sec. II A above
and clarify the limitation of this framework. In addi-
tion, we show that the limitation can be eliminated when
states prepared in different runs are independent. The
situation is much more complicated when these states
are correlated, which motivates the study of QSV in the
adversarial scenario presented in the rest of this paper.
A. What is verified in QSV?
Consider a device that is supposed to produce the
target state |Ψ〉 in the Hilbert space H. In practice,
the device may actually produce σ1, σ2, . . . , σN in N
runs. In the framework of PLM, it is assumed that
the fidelity 〈Ψ|σj |Ψ〉 either equals 1 for all j or satis-
fies 〈Ψ|σj |Ψ〉 ≤ 1 − ǫ for all j [42]. In the i.i.d. case,
all σj are identical, so the PLM assumption is actually
not necessary (or automatically guaranteed) to derive the
conclusions presented in Sec. II A. If we drop the i.i.d.
assumption, then the assumption of PLM is quite unnat-
ural and difficult to guarantee. Moreover, the conclusion
on QSV drawn based on this assumption is much weaker
than what the word “verify” usually conveys. Suppose the
test El is performed with probability µl and Ω =
∑
l µlEl
as in Sec. II A. After N tests are passed, we can only con-
clude that the probability of passing N tests is at most
[1− ν(Ω)ǫ]N if 〈Ψ|σj |Ψ〉 ≤ 1− ǫ for all j. In other words,
passing these tests only confirm that 〈Ψ|σj |Ψ〉 > 1 − ǫ
for at least one run j with significance level [1−ν(Ω)ǫ]N .
Such a weak conclusion is usually far from enough in
practice. Note that the property of each run on aver-
age is more relevant if we want to make sure that the
device works as expected most of the time rather than
occasionally.
B. Independent state preparation
Fortunately we can drop the PLM assumption and
draw a stronger conclusion as long as all states σj are
prepared independently of each other. Note that we do
not need the i.i.d. assumption. The variation in σj over
different runs may be caused by inevitable imperfections
of the device or fluctuations in various relevant parame-
ters for example.
Proposition 1. Suppose the N states σ1, σ2, . . . , σN are
independent of each other. Then the probability that
they can pass all N tests associated with the strategy Ω
satisfies
N∏
j=1
〈Ψ|σj |Ψ〉 ≤ [1− ν(Ω)ǫ¯]N , (11)
where ǫ¯ =
∑
j ǫj/N with ǫj = 1−〈Ψ|σj |Ψ〉 is the average
infidelity.
This proposition guarantees that the average fidelity
satisfies
∑
j〈Ψ|σj |Ψ〉/N > 1 − ǫ with significance level
δ = (1 − ǫ)N if N tests are passed. To verify |Ψ〉 within
infidelity ǫ and significance level δ, the minimum number
of tests reads
NNA(ǫ, δ,Ω)=
⌈
1
ln[1− ν(Ω)ǫ] ln δ
⌉
≤
⌈
1
ν(Ω)ǫ
ln
1
δ
⌉
.
(12)
This formula is identical to the one in Eq. (2), but it
does not rely on the unnatural assumption imposed by
PLM [42]. Accordingly, the meaning of “verification” is
different. Here we can verify the average fidelity of the
states σ1, σ2, . . . σN prepared by the device rather than
the maximal fidelity.
Proof of Proposition 1.
N∏
j=1
〈Ψ|σj |Ψ〉 ≤
N∏
j=1
[1− ν(Ω)ǫj ] ≤ [1− ν(Ω)ǫ¯]N . (13)
Here the first inequality follows from Eq. (1) and is satu-
rated iff each σj is supported in the subspace associated
with the largest and second largest eigenvalues of Ω. The
second inequality follows from the familiar inequality be-
tween the geometric mean and arithmetic mean and is
saturated iff all ǫj are equal to ǫ¯; that is, all σj have the
same fidelity (and infidelity) with the target state. Note
that variation in σj cannot increase the passing proba-
bility once the average infidelity ǫ¯ is fixed.
C. Correlated state preparation
Here we show that the conclusion in Secs. II A and
III B will fail if the states σ1, σ2, . . . , σN are correlated.
As a special example, suppose the device produces the
ideal target state (|Ψ〉〈Ψ|)⊗N in N runs with probability
0 < a < 1 and the alternative σ⊗N with probability 1−a,
where 〈Ψ|σ|Ψ〉 = 1 − ǫ′ < 1. The reduced state of each
party reads a(|Ψ〉〈Ψ|)+(1−a)σ and its infidelity with the
5target state is ǫ = (1−a)ǫ′. Note that the device can pass
N tests with probability at least a no matter how large
N is. So it is impossible to verify the target state within
infidelity ǫ = (1 − a)ǫ′ and significance level δ < a using
the approach presented in Sec. II A or that in Sec. III B.
This observation reveals another limitation of the PLM
framework of QSV. To overcome this difficulty, we need
to consider a different framework of QSV as formulated
in the next section.
IV. QUANTUM STATE VERIFICATION IN
THE ADVERSARIAL SCENARIO
Now we turn to the adversarial scenario in which the
device for generating quantum states is controlled by
a potentially malicious adversary. In this case the de-
vice may produce arbitrary correlated or even entan-
gled states. Efficient verification of quantum states in
such adversarial scenario is crucial to many quantum
information-processing tasks that entail high security re-
quirements, such as blind quantum computation [13–17]
and quantum networks [23–25]. However, little is known
about this topic in the literature. The approach of PLM
does not work as illustrated by the example of correlated
state preparation in Sec. III C. Most other studies in the
literature only focus on specific families of states, such as
graph states [14–16, 25] and hypergraph states [19, 51].
In addition, known protocols are too resource consum-
ing to be applied in practice, especially for hypergraph
states, in which case the best protocol known in the lit-
erature requires an astronomical number of tests already
for three-qubit hypergraph states. The difficulty in con-
structing efficient verification protocols in the adversarial
scenario is tied to the fact that even for a given protocol,
no efficient method is available for determining the mini-
mal resource cost necessary to reach the target precision.
In this section we introduce a general framework of
pure state verification in the adversarial scenario together
with the main figures of merit. The basic ideas presented
here will serve as a stepping stone for the following dis-
cussions.
A. Formulation
To establish a reliable and efficient framework for ver-
ifying pure states in the adversarial scenario, first note
that the verification and application of a quantum state
cannot be completely separated in the adversarial sce-
nario. Otherwise, the device may produce ideal target
states in the verification stage and so can always pass
the tests, but produce a garbage state in the application
stage. To resolve this problem, suppose the device pro-
duces an arbitrary correlated or entangled state ρ on the
whole system H⊗(N+1). Our goal is to ensure that the
reduced state on one system has infidelity less than ǫ by
performing N tests on other systems. We can randomly
choose N systems and apply a verification strategy Ω to
each system chosen and accept the state on the remain-
ing system iff all N tests are passed. Since N systems are
chosen randomly, we may assume that ρ is permutation
invariant without loss of generality.
Suppose the strategy Ω is applied to the first N sys-
tems, then the probability that ρ can pass N tests reads
pρ = tr[(Ω
⊗N ⊗ 1)ρ]. (14)
The reduced state on system N +1 (assuming pρ > 0) is
given by
σ′N+1 = p
−1
ρ tr1,2,...,N [(Ω
⊗N ⊗ 1)ρ], (15)
where tr1,2,...,N means the partial trace over the systems
1, 2, . . . , N . The fidelity between σ′N+1 and the target
state |Ψ〉 reads
Fρ = 〈Ψ|σ′N+1|Ψ〉 = p−1ρ fρ, (16)
where
fρ = tr[(Ω
⊗N ⊗ |Ψ〉〈Ψ|)ρ]. (17)
When ρ = σ⊗(N+1) is a tensor power of the state σ with
0 < ǫ′ = 1 − 〈Ψ|σ|Ψ〉 < 1, we have pρ ≤ [1 − ν(Ω)ǫ′]N ,
σ′N+1 = σ, and Fρ = 1 − ǫ′. These conclusions coincide
with the counterpart for the nonadversarial scenario as
expected. The situation is different if ρ does not have this
form. Suppose ρ = a(|Ψ〉〈Ψ|)⊗(N+1) + (1 − a)σ⊗(N+1)
with 0 < a < 1 for example; cf. Sec. III C. If N tests are
passed, then the reduced state of party N + 1 reads
σ′N+1 =
a|Ψ〉〈Ψ|+ bσ
a+ b
, (18)
where b := (1− a)[tr(Ωσ)]N satisfies
b ≤ (1 − a)[1− ν(Ω)ǫ′]N (19)
and decreases exponentially with N . Therefore, the infi-
delity 1−〈Ψ|σ′N+1|Ψ〉 approaches zero exponentially with
N even if a is arbitrarily small. In other words, if the in-
fidelity is bounded from below 1 − 〈Ψ|σ′N+1|Ψ〉 ≥ ǫ for
0 < ǫ < 1, then a should approach zero as N increases;
accordingly, the passing probability will approach zero.
This observation indicates that we can verify the target
state within any given infidelity 0 < ǫ < 1 and signif-
icance level 0 < δ < 1 even when the states prepared
are correlated, which demonstrates the advantage of the
alternative approach presented above over the PLM ap-
proach. In the rest of this paper we will show that indeed
it is possible to verify pure states efficiently even if the
device is controlled by the adversary and produces ar-
bitrarily correlated or even entangled states allowed by
quantum mechanics.
6B. Main figures of merit
To characterize the performance of the strategy Ω ap-
plied to the adversarial scenario, here we introduce four
figures of merit. Define
ζ(N, δ,Ω) := min
ρ
{
fρ | pρ ≥ δ
}
, 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, (20a)
η(N, f,Ω) := max
ρ
{
pρ | fρ ≤ f
}
, 0 ≤ f ≤ 1, (20b)
F (N, δ,Ω) := min
ρ
{
p−1ρ fρ | pρ ≥ δ
}
, 0 < δ ≤ 1, (20c)
F(N, f,Ω) := min
ρ
{
p−1ρ fρ | fρ ≥ f
}
, 0 < f ≤ 1, (20d)
where N ≥ 1 is the number of tests performed. The four
figures of merit are closely related to each other, as we
shall see later. In practice F (N, δ,Ω) is a main figure
of merit of interest; it denotes the minimum fidelity of
the state on the remaining party (with the target state),
assuming that ρ can pass N tests with significance level
at least δ. By definition F (N, δ,Ω) and ζ(N, δ,Ω) are
nondecreasing in δ, while F(N, f,Ω) and η(N, f,Ω) are
nondecreasing in f . A simple upper bound for F (N, δ,Ω)
can be derived by considering quantum states ρ that can
be expressed as tensor powers in Eq. (20c), which yields
F (N, δ,Ω) ≤ max
{
0, 1− 1− δ
1/N
ν(Ω)
}
. (21)
The four figures of merit defined in Eq. (20) are tied
to the two-dimensional region composed of all the points
(pρ, fρ) for density matrices ρ, that is,
RN,Ω := {(pρ, fρ)|∀ρ}. (22)
This geometric picture will be very helpful to understand-
ing QSV in the adversarial scenario. By definition the
region RN,Ω is convex since the state space is convex,
and pρ, fρ are both linear in ρ. What is not so obvious at
the moment is that the region RN,Ω is actually a convex
polygon.
In addition to characterizing the verification precision
that is achievable for a given number N of tests, it is
equally important to determine the minimum number of
tests required to reach a given precision. To this end, we
define N(ǫ, δ,Ω) as the minimum value of N that satisfies
the condition F (N, δ,Ω) ≥ 1− ǫ, that is,
N(ǫ, δ,Ω) := min{N |F (N, δ,Ω) ≥ 1− ǫ}. (23)
As an implication of Eq. (21), we have
N(ǫ, δ,Ω) ≥
⌈
1
ln[1− ν(Ω)ǫ] ln δ
⌉
= NNA(ǫ, δ,Ω) (24)
as expected since it is much more difficult to verify a
quantum state in the adversarial scenario than nonad-
versarial scenario. Then how much overhead is required
in the adversarial scenario? Can we achieve the same
scaling behaviors in ǫ and δ?
In general it is very difficult to derive an analytical
formula for N(ǫ, δ,Ω) if not impossible. Therefore, it
is nontrivial to determine the efficiency limit of QSV in
the adversarial scenario even if three is no restriction on
the accessible measurements, or even if the target state
belongs to a single party, which is in sharp contrast with
QSV in the nonadversarial scenario. Indeed, it took a
long time and a lot of efforts to settle these problems.
V. COMPUTATION OF THE VERIFICATION
PRECISION
In this section we develop a general method for com-
puting the figures of merit defined in Eq. (20), which
characterize the verification precision in the adversarial
scenario. We also clarify the properties of these figures
of merit in preparation for latter study. Both algebraic
derivation and geometric pictures will be helpful in our
analysis.
A. Key observations
Suppose the verification operator Ω for the target state
|Ψ〉 ∈ H has spectral decomposition Ω = ∑Dj=1 λjΠj ,
where λj are the eigenvalues of Ω arranged in decreasing
order 1 = λ1 > λ2 ≥ · · · ≥ λD, and Πj are mutually
orthogonal rank-1 projectors with Π1 = |Ψ〉〈Ψ|. Here
the second largest eigenvalue β := λ2 and the small-
est eigenvalue τ := λD deserve special attention because
they determine the performance of Ω to a large extent,
as we shall see later. Suppose the adversary produces the
state ρ on the whole system H⊗(N+1), which is permu-
tation invariant (cf. Sec. IV). Without loss of generality,
we may assume that ρ is diagonal in the product basis
constructed from the eigenbasis of Ω (as determined by
the projectors Πj), since pρ, fρ, and Fρ only depend on
the diagonal elements of ρ.
Let k = (k1, k2, . . . , kD) be a sequence of D nonnega-
tive integers that sum up to N+1, that is,
∑
j kj = N+1.
Let SN be the set of all such sequences. For each
k ∈ SN , we can define a permutation-invariant diagonal
density matrix ρk on H⊗(N+1) as the uniform mixture
of all permutations of Π⊗k11 ⊗ Π⊗k22 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ΠkDD . Then
any permutation-invariant diagonal density matrix ρ on
H⊗(N+1) can be expressed as ρ = ∑k∈SN ckρk, where
ck form a probability distribution on SN . Accordingly,
pρ =
∑
k∈SN
ckηk(λ), fρ =
∑
k∈SN
ckζk(λ), (25)
Fρ =
fρ
pρ
=
∑
k∈SN
ckζk(λ)∑
k∈SN
ckηk(λ)
, (26)
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FIG. 1. (color online) The region RN,Ω composed of (pρ, fρ)
as defined in Eq. (22). This region is the convex hull of points
(ηk(λ), ζk(λ)) for k ∈ SN , which are highlighted as red dots.
Here Ω has three distinct eigenvalues, namely, 1, 0.4, and 0.2.
where λ := (λ1, λ2, . . . , λD) and
ηk(λ) := pρk =
∑
i|ki>0
ki
(N + 1)
λki−1i
∏
j 6=i|kj>0
λ
kj
j ,
ζk(λ) := fρk =
k1
N + 1
∏
i|ki>0
λkii .
(27)
Here we set λ0i = 1 even if λi = 0.
The assumption 1 = λ1 > λ2 ≥ · · · ≥ λD = τ implies
that ζk(λ) ≤ ηk(λ) ≤ 1; the second inequality is satu-
rated iff k = k0 := (N + 1, 0, . . . , 0), in which case both
inequalities are saturated, that is, ζk0(λ) = ηk0(λ) = 1.
As an implication, we have fρ ≤ pρ ≤ 1, and the second
inequality is saturated iff ρ = ρk0 = (|Ψ〉〈Ψ|)⊗(N+1), in
which case fρ = pρ = 1. This observation implies that
F (N, δ = 1,Ω) = ζ(N, δ = 1,Ω) = 1, (28)
F(N, f = 1,Ω) = η(N, f = 1,Ω) = 1. (29)
By contrast, ηk(λ) ≥ τN , and the lower bound is satu-
rated when k = (0, . . . , 0, N + 1). Accordingly, pρ ≥ τN ,
and the lower bound is saturated when ρ = Π
⊗(N+1)
D .
In view of the above discussion, the region RN,Ω de-
fined in Eq. (22) is the convex hull of (ηk(λ), ζk(λ)) for
all k ∈ SN , which is a polygon, as illustrated in Fig. 1.
It should be emphasized that RN,Ω only depends on the
distinct eigenvalues of Ω, but not on their degeneracies
(though λ1 is not degenerate by assumption). The same
conclusion also applies to the figures of merit F (N, δ,Ω),
F(N, f,Ω), ζ(N, δ,Ω), and η(N, f,Ω) defined in Eq. (20)
given that they are completely determined by the region
RN,Ω. For example, F (N, δ,Ω) corresponds to the lower
boundary of the intersection of RN,Ω and the vertical
line pρ = δ as long as δ ≥ τN . This geometric pic-
ture is very helpful to understanding the properties of
F (N, δ,Ω), although in general it is not easy to find an
explicit analytical formula. As N increases, the region
RN,Ω concentrates more and more around the diagonal
defined by the equation f = p as illustrated in Fig. 1,
which means F (N, δ,Ω) approaches 1 as N increases.
Denote by σ(Ω) the set of distinct eigenvalues of Ω. If
Ω′ is another verification operator for |Ψ〉 with β(Ω′) < 1
and σ(Ω′) ⊂ σ(Ω). Then Ω′ is more efficient than Ω in
the sense that
F (N, δ,Ω′) ≥ F (N, δ,Ω), N(ǫ, δ,Ω′) ≤ N(ǫ, δ,Ω). (30)
This observation is instructive to constructing efficient
verification protocols, as we shall see in Sec. VI.
B. Computation of the main figures of merit
Here we show that the four figures of merit ζ(N, δ,Ω),
η(N, f,Ω), F (N, δ,Ω), and F(N, f,Ω) can be computed
by linear programming; Lemmas 1 and 2 below are
proved in Appendix B. To start with, we first deter-
mine η(N, 0,Ω), the maximum of pρ under the condition
fρ = 0.
Lemma 1. η(N, 0,Ω) = δc, where
δc :=
{
βN τ > 0,
max{βN , 1/(N + 1)} τ = 0. (31)
Lemma 1 has implications for the figures of merit
F (N, δ,Ω) and ζ(N, δ,Ω) as well,
F (N, δ,Ω) = ζ(N, δ,Ω) = 0, 0 < δ ≤ δc, (32)
F (N, δ,Ω) > 0, ζ(N, δ,Ω) > 0, δc < δ ≤ 1. (33)
Next, we introduce alternative definitions of the figures
of merit defined in Eq. (20), which are easier to analyze
and compute. Define
ζ˜(N, δ,Ω) :=
{
minρ
{
fρ | pρ = δ
}
δc ≤ δ ≤ 1,
0 0 ≤ δ ≤ δc, (34a)
η˜(N, f,Ω) :=max
ρ
{
pρ | fρ = f
}
, 0 ≤ f ≤ 1, (34b)
F˜ (N, δ,Ω) := δ−1ζ˜(N, δ,Ω), 0 < δ ≤ 1, (34c)
F˜(N, f,Ω) := [η˜(N, f,Ω)]−1f, 0 < f ≤ 1. (34d)
Lemma 2. Suppose 0 < δ, f ≤ 1. Then
ζ(N, δ,Ω) = ζ˜(N, δ,Ω), (35a)
η(N, f,Ω) = η˜(N, f,Ω), (35b)
F (N, δ,Ω) = F˜ (N, δ,Ω), (35c)
F(N, f,Ω) = F˜(N, f,Ω). (35d)
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F (N, δ,Ω) = δ−1ζ˜(N, δ,Ω) = δ−1ζ(N, δ,Ω), (36)
F(N, f,Ω) = [η˜(N, f,Ω)]−1f = [η(N, f,Ω)]−1f. (37)
To compute F (N, δ,Ω) and F(N, f,Ω), it suffices to com-
pute ζ(N, δ,Ω) and η(N, f,Ω). By virtue of Eq. (25) and
Lemma 2, ζ(N, δ,Ω) with δc ≤ δ ≤ 1 and η(N, f,Ω) with
0 ≤ f ≤ 1 can be computed via linear programming,
ζ(N, δ,Ω) = min
{ck}
{ ∑
k∈SN
ckζk(λ)
∣∣∣∣ ∑
k∈SN
ckηk(λ) = δ
}
,
(38a)
η(N, f,Ω) = max
{ck}
{ ∑
k∈SN
ckηk(λ)
∣∣∣∣ ∑
k∈SN
ckζk(λ) = f
}
.
(38b)
Here the minimum in Eq. (38a) can be attained at a dis-
tribution {ck} that is supported on at most two points
in SN ; a similar conclusion holds for the maximum in
Eq. (38b). These conclusions are tied to the geomet-
ric fact that any boundary point of RN,Ω lies on a line
segment that connects two extremal points. This obser-
vation can greatly simplify the computation of F (N, δ,Ω)
and F(N, f,Ω) as well as ζ(N, δ,Ω) and η(N, f,Ω). In ad-
dition to the computational value, Eq. (38) implies that
ζ(N, δ,Ω) and η(N, f,Ω) are piecewise linear functions,
whose turning points correspond to the extremal points
of the region RN,Ω and have the form (ηk(λ), ζk(λ)) for
some k ∈ SN ; cf. Lemma 13 in Appendix B.
C. Properties of the main figures of merit
Next, we summarize the main properties of the
five figures of merit ζ(N, δ,Ω), η(N, f,Ω), F (N, δ,Ω),
F(N, f,Ω), and N(ǫ, δ,Ω); the proofs are relegated to
Appendix B.
Lemma 3. The following statements hold.
1. ζ(N, δ,Ω) is convex in δ for 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 and is strictly
increasing in δ for δc ≤ δ ≤ 1.
2. η(N, f,Ω) is concave and strictly increasing in f for
0 ≤ f ≤ 1.
3. F (N, δ,Ω) is strictly increasing in δ for δc ≤ δ ≤ 1.
4. F(N, f,Ω) is strictly increasing in f for 0 < f ≤ 1.
Note that the two functions ζ(N, δ,Ω) and F (N, δ,Ω)
are nondecreasing in δ over the whole interval 0 < δ ≤ 1,
given that they are nonnegative and that F (N, δ,Ω) =
ζ(N, δ,Ω) = 0 for 0 < δ ≤ δc. This conclusion also
follows from the definitions in Eq. (20).
Lemma 4. Suppose 0 ≤ δ, f ≤ 1. Then
η(N, ζ(N, δ,Ω),Ω) = max{δ, δc}, (39)
ζ(N, η(N, f,Ω),Ω) = f. (40)
Lemma 5. Suppose N ≥ 2 and 0 < δ, f ≤ 1. Then
ζ(N, δ,Ω) ≥ ζ(N − 1, δ,Ω), (41a)
F (N, δ,Ω) ≥ F (N − 1, δ,Ω), (41b)
η(N, f,Ω) ≤ η(N − 1, f,Ω), (41c)
F(N, f,Ω) ≥ F(N − 1, f,Ω). (41d)
The first two inequalities are saturated iff δ ≤ δc or δ = 1,
where δc is given in Eq. (31). The last two inequalities
are saturated iff f = 1.
Finally, we turn to the figure of meritN(ǫ, δ,Ω) defined
in Eq. (23). As an implication of Lemma 3, N(ǫ, δ,Ω)
increases monotonically with 1/ǫ and 1/δ as expected.
The following lemma provides several equivalent ways for
computing N(ǫ, δ,Ω).
Lemma 6. Suppose 0 < ǫ, δ < 1. Then
N(ǫ, δ,Ω) = min{N | ζ(N, δ,Ω) ≥ δ(1− ǫ)} (42)
= min{N | η(N, δ(1 − ǫ),Ω) ≤ δ} (43)
= min{N | F(N, δ(1− ǫ),Ω) ≥ (1− ǫ)}. (44)
VI. HOMOGENEOUS STRATEGIES
A strategy (or verification operator) Ω for |Ψ〉 is ho-
mogeneous if it has the form
Ω = |Ψ〉〈Ψ|+ λ(1 − |Ψ〉〈Ψ|), (45)
where 0 ≤ λ < 1. In this case, all eigenvalues of Ω
are equal to λ except for the largest one, so we have
β = τ = λ and ν = 1−λ. Incidentally, the homogeneous
strategy Ω can always be realized by performing the test
P = |Ψ〉〈Ψ| with probability 1−λ and the trivial test with
probability λ. By “trivial test” we mean the test projector
is equal to the identity operator. For bipartite pure states
[40, 41, 43, 44] and stabilizer states [42], the homogeneous
strategy can also be realized by virtue of local projective
measurements when λ is sufficiently large.
In the nonadversarial scenario, a smaller λ achieves
a better performance among homogeneous strategies.
Here, we clarify what λ is optimal in the adversarial sce-
nario, which turns out to be very different from the non-
adversarial scenario.
Given that the homogeneous strategy Ω in Eq. (45) is
determined by the parameter λ, it is more informative to
express the figures of merit defined in Eqs. (20) and (23)
as follows,
F (N, δ, λ) := F (N, δ,Ω), (46a)
F(N, f, λ) := F(N, f,Ω), (46b)
ζ(N, δ, λ) := ζ(N, δ,Ω), (46c)
η(N, f, λ) := η(N, f,Ω), (46d)
N(ǫ, δ, λ) := N(ǫ, δ,Ω). (46e)
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η(N, 0, λ) = δc =
{
λN λ > 0,
1/(N + 1) λ = 0.
(47)
Suppose Ω˜ is an arbitrary verification operator with
eigenvalues 1 = λ˜1 > λ˜2 ≥ · · · ≥ λ˜D. Then we have
F (N, δ, λ˜j) ≥ F (N, δ, Ω˜) for 2 ≤ j ≤ D according to
Eq. (30). Therefore, the optimal performance can always
be achieved by a homogeneous strategy if there is no
restriction on the accessible measurements. This obser-
vation reveals the importance of homogeneous strategies
to QSV in the adversarial scenario.
In preparation for the following discussions, we need
to introduce a few more notations. Denote by Z and Z≥0
the set of integers and the set of nonnegative integers,
respectively. For k ∈ Z≥0, define
ηk(λ) :=
(N + 1− k)λk + kλk−1
N + 1
,
ζk(λ) :=
(N + 1− k)λk
N + 1
.
(48)
We take the convention that λ0 = η0(λ) = ζ0(λ) = 1
even if λ = 0. Note that
ηk(λ) = ηk(λ), ζk(λ) = ζk(λ) (49)
when k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N + 1}, where k = (N + 1 − k, k),
λ = (1, λ), and ηk(λ), ζk(λ) are defined in Eq. (27). The
extension of the definitions of ηk(λ) and ζk(λ) over k to
the set Z≥0 will be useful in proving several important
results on homogeneous strategies.
A. The singular homogeneous strategy
When λ = 0, the verification operator Ω = |Ψ〉〈Ψ| is
singular, and Eq. (48) reduces to
ηk(λ) =


1 k = 0,
(N + 1)−1 k = 1,
0 k ≥ 2.
ζk(λ) =
{
1 k = 0,
0 k ≥ 1.
(50)
By Lemma 2, we have F (N, δ, λ = 0) = ζ(N, δ, λ = 0)/δ,
where
ζ(N, δ, λ = 0) =
{
0 δ ≤ (N + 1)−1,
(N+1)δ−1
N δ ≥ (N + 1)−1.
(51)
The minimum number of tests required to verify the pure
state |Ψ〉 within infidelity ǫ and significance level δ reads
N(ǫ, δ, λ = 0) =
⌈
1− δ
ǫδ
⌉
. (52)
Here the scaling with 1/δ is suboptimal although the
strategy is optimal for the nonadversarial scenario ac-
cording to Eqs. (2) and (12). Fortunately, nonsingular
homogeneous strategies can achieve a better scaling be-
havior, as we shall see shortly.
B. Nonsingular homogeneous strategies
1. Verification precision
Here we assume 0 < λ < 1, so the homogeneous strat-
egy defined in Eq. (45) is nonsingular. In this case, ηk(λ)
decreases strictly monotonically with k for k ∈ Z≥0,
and ζk(λ) decreases strictly monotonically with k for
k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N + 1}. Define
ck(δ, λ) :=
δ − ηk+1(λ)
ηk(λ)− ηk+1(λ) , (53)
ζ(N, δ, λ, k) :=ck(δ, λ)ζk(λ) + [1− ck(δ, λ)]ζk+1(λ)
=
λ{δ[1 + (N − k)ν]− λk}
ν(kν +Nλ)
, (54)
where ν = 1 − λ. The following theorem clarifies the
precision that can be achieved by a given number of tests;
see Appendix C 2 for a proof.
Theorem 1. Suppose 0 < λ < 1 and 0 < δ ≤ 1. Then
we have F (N, δ, λ) = ζ(N, δ, λ)/δ with
ζ(N, δ, λ) =
{
0 δ ≤ λN ,
ζ(N, δ, λ, k∗) δ > λ
N ,
(55)
where k∗ is the largest integer k that satisfies ηk(λ) ≥ δ,
that is, (N + 1− k)λk + kλk−1 ≥ (N + 1)δ.
The choice of the parameter k∗ in Theorem 1 guar-
antees that 0 < ck∗(δ, λ) ≤ 1. Given the assumption
λN < δ ≤ 1, we can deduce from Eq. (48) that k∗ is
equal to either k+ or k−, where
k+ :=⌈logλ δ⌉, k− := ⌊logλ δ⌋. (56)
When k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N}, Theorem 1 implies that
F (N, δ = λk, λ) =
(N − k)λ
k + (N − k)λ, (57)
which decreases monotonically with k. In particular we
have F (N, δ = 1, λ) = 1 as expected; cf. Eq. (28). When
δ = ηk(λ) with k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N + 1}, we have
F (N, δ = ηk(λ), λ) =
ζk(λ)
ηk(λ)
=
(N + 1− k)λ
k + (N + 1− k)λ, (58)
which also decreases monotonically with k. The depen-
dences of ζ(N, δ, λ) and F (N, δ, λ) on δ and λ are illus-
trated in Fig. 2.
Corollary 1. Suppose 0 < λ < 1 and 0 < δ ≤ 1. Then
ζ(N, δ, λ) = max
{
0, max
k∈Z≥0
ζ(N, δ, λ, k)
}
(59)
= max
{
0, ζ(N, δ, λ, k+), ζ(N, δ, λ, k−)}. (60)
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FIG. 2. (color online) Variations of ζ(N, δ, λ) and F (N, δ, λ)
with δ and λ for N = 2 (left plots) and N = 10 (right plots).
Corollary 1 follows from Theorem 1 above and
Lemma 16 in Appendix C. Equation (59) provides a fam-
ily of lower bounds for ζ(N, δ, λ), namely,
ζ(N, δ, λ) ≥ ζ(N, δ, λ, k), ∀k ∈ Z≥0. (61)
Corollary 2. Suppose 0 ≤ λ < 1. Then F (N, δ, λ) is
nondecreasing in δ and N .
Corollary 3. Suppose 0 < λ < 1 and λN ≤ δ ≤ 1.
Then
(N − k+)λ
k+ + (N − k+)λ ≤ F (N, δ, λ) ≤
(N − k−)λ
k− + (N − k−)λ. (62)
Corollary 2 follows from Eq. (51) and Theorem 1; al-
ternatively, it follows from Lemmas 3 and 5. Corollary 3
is an immediate consequence of Corollary 2 and Eq. (57).
2. Number of required tests
Now, we are ready to determine the minimum number
of tests required to verify the pure state |Ψ〉 within infi-
delity ǫ and significance level δ in the adversarial scenario.
Theorems 2 and 3 below are proved in Appendix C 2. The
results are illustrated in Figs. 3 and 4. Define
N˜(ǫ, δ, λ, k) :=
kν2δF + λk+1 + λδ(kν − 1)
λνδǫ
, (63)
where F = 1− ǫ and ν = 1− λ.
Theorem 2. Suppose 0 < ǫ, δ, λ < 1. Then
N(ǫ, δ, λ) =
⌈
min
k∈Z≥0
N˜(ǫ, δ, λ, k)
⌉
=
⌈
N˜(ǫ, δ, λ, k∗)
⌉
, (64)
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FIG. 3. (color online) Minimum numbers of tests required to
verify a pure state with five different homogeneous strategies.
Here ǫ = 0.01 in the upper plot and ǫ = 0.1 in the lower plot.
In each plot, the red curve represents the approximate formula
(1 − δ)/(ǫδ) when λ = 0; cf. Eq. (52). The four lines rep-
resent the approximate formula (F + λǫ) log10 δ/(λǫ log10 λ);
cf. Eq. (77).
where k∗ is the largest integer k that satisfies the inequal-
ity δ ≤ λk/(Fν + λ) = λk/(F + λǫ).
According to Eq. (64) above and Lemma 17 in Ap-
pendix C, N(ǫ, δ, λ) ≥ k∗ and it is nonincreasing in
ǫ and δ as expected. Suppose k is a positive integer,
then it is straightforward to verify that N˜(ǫ, δ, λ, k) ≤
N˜(ǫ, δ, λ, k− 1) iff δ ≤ λk/(F +λǫ). In addition, we have
λk++1
F + λǫ
< δ <
λk−
F + λǫ
(65)
given that λ < F + λǫ < 1. So k∗ in Eq. (64) is equal to
either k+ or k−. Thanks to this observation, N(ǫ, δ, λ)
can also be expressed as follows,
N(ǫ, δ, λ) =
⌈
min
{
N˜+(ǫ, δ, λ), N˜−(ǫ, δ, λ)
}⌉
(66)
=
{
⌈N˜−(ǫ, δ, λ)⌉ δ ≥ λk+F+λǫ ,
⌈N+(ǫ, δ, λ)⌉ δ ≤ λk+F+λǫ ,
(67)
where
N˜±(ǫ, δ, λ) := N˜(ǫ, δ, λ, k±). (68)
Corollary 4. Suppose 0 < ǫ, δ, λ < 1. Then
N(ǫ, δ, λ) ≤ ⌈N˜(ǫ, δ, λ, k)⌉ ∀k ∈ Z≥0, (69)
where the upper bound for a given k is saturated when
λk+1/(F + λǫ) ≤ δ ≤ λk/(F + λǫ).
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Here ǫ = 0.01 in the upper plot and ǫ = 0.1 in the lower
plot. The four curves in each plot represent the approximate
formula ln δ/(λǫ lnλ); cf. Eqs. (79) and (81).
Corollary 4 is an easy consequence of Theorem 2. The
two cases k = 0, 1 are of special interest,
N(ǫ, δ, λ) ≤ ⌈N˜(ǫ, δ, λ, 0)⌉ =
⌈
1− δ
νǫδ
⌉
, (70)
N(ǫ, δ, λ) ≤ ⌈N˜(ǫ, δ, λ, 1)⌉ =
⌈
ν2δF + λ2 − λ2δ
λνδǫ
⌉
. (71)
If λ/(F + λǫ) ≤ δ < 1, then Eq. (70) is saturated, so we
have
N(ǫ, δ, λ) =
⌈
1− δ
νǫδ
⌉
. (72)
This result also holds when λ = 0 (as long as 0 < δ < 1)
according to Eq. (52). If λ2/(F + λǫ) ≤ δ ≤ λ/(F + λǫ),
then Eq. (71) is saturated, so we have
N(ǫ, δ, λ) =
⌈
ν2δF + λ2 − λ2δ
λνδǫ
⌉
≥ 2
√
(1− δ)F
ǫ
√
δ
, (73)
where the lower bound is proved in Appendix C 2. Equa-
tions (72) and (73) show that homogeneous strategies
with small λ, say λ ≤ 0.1, are not efficient for high-
precision QSV (say ǫ, δ ≤ 0.1), as reflected in Fig. 4.
The following theorem provides informative bounds for
N(ǫ, δ, λ), which complement the analytical formula in
Theorem 2.
Theorem 3. Suppose 0 < ǫ, δ, λ < 1. Then
k− +
⌈
k−F
λǫ
⌉
≤ N(ǫ, δ, λ) ≤ k+ +
⌈
k+F
λǫ
⌉
, (74)
N(ǫ, δ, λ) ≤
⌈
logλ δ
λǫ
− νk−
λ
⌉
=
⌈
ln δ
λǫ lnλ
− νk−
λ
⌉
. (75)
All three bounds in Eqs. (74) and (75) are saturated when
logλ δ is an integer.
When δ ≤ λ ≤ 1/2, we have k− ≥ 1 and νk−/λ ≥ 1,
so Eq. (75) implies that
N(ǫ, δ, λ) <
ln δ
λǫ lnλ
. (76)
On the other hand, by virtue of Eq. (74), we can derive
lim
δ→0
N(ǫ, δ, λ)
ln δ−1
=
F + λǫ
λǫ lnλ−1
, (77)
k−
λ
≤ lim
ǫ→0
ǫN(ǫ, δ, λ) ≤ k+
λ
, (78)
lim
ǫ,δ→0
ǫN(ǫ, δ, λ)
ln δ−1
=
1
λ lnλ−1
. (79)
The exact value of limǫ→0 ǫN(ǫ, δ, λ) can be derived from
Eq. (67), with the result
lim
ǫ→0
ǫN(ǫ, δ, λ) = lim
ǫ→0
ǫN˜−(ǫ, δ, λ) =
k−
λ
+
λk− − δ
νδ
, (80)
note that the inequality δ ≥ λk+/(F + λǫ) is always sat-
isfied in the limit ǫ→ 0 if logλ δ is not an integer.
C. Optimal homogeneous strategies
1. Optimal strategies in the high precision limit ǫ, δ → 0
In the adversarial scenario, the optimal performance
can always be achieved by a homogeneous strategy if
there is no restriction on the measurements. However,
the value of λ that minimizes N(ǫ, δ, λ) depends on the
target precision, as characterized by ǫ and δ. We can-
not find a homogeneous strategy that is optimal for all
ǫ and δ, unlike the nonadversarial scenario. Here we are
mostly interested in the high precision limit, which means
ǫ, δ → 0.
According to Eq. (79), in the high-precision limit, the
minimum number of tests can be approximated as fol-
lows,
N(ǫ, δ, λ) ≈ (λǫ)−1 logλ δ = (λǫ lnλ)−1 ln δ. (81)
To understand the condition of this approximation, note
that k± ≈ logλ δ if δ ≪ λ, which is usually the case in
high-precision verification. If in addition ǫ≪ 1, then the
ratio of the lower bound over the upper bound in Eq. (74)
is close to 1, so that the two bounds are nearly tight with
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respect to the relative deviation. In this case, Eq. (81) is a
good approximation. Furthermore, numerical calculation
shows that Eq. (81) is quite accurate for most parameter
range of interest, as illustrated in Figs. 3 and 4. When
λ is very small, the approximation in Eq. (81) is not
so good. Meanwhile, such homogeneous strategies are
not efficient when ǫ, δ ≤ 0.1 according to Eqs. (72) and
(73), as illustrated in Fig. 4; in addition, they are not so
important due to the reasons explained in Sec. IX later.
Thanks to Theorems 2 and 3, the number of tests
required by any nonsingular homogeneous strategy can
achieve the same scaling behaviors with ǫ and δ as
the counterpart in the nonadversarial scenario for high-
precision QSV. In the limit ǫ, δ → 0, the efficiency is char-
acterized by the function (λ ln λ−1)−1. Analysis shows
that the function (λ lnλ−1)−1 is convex for 0 < λ < 1
and attains the minimum e when λ = 1/e, with e being
the base of the natural logarithm. It is strictly decreas-
ing in λ when 0 < λ ≤ 1/e and strictly increasing when
1/e ≤ λ < 1; cf. Fig. 4. Therefore, the homogeneous
strategy with λ = 1/e, that is, ν = 1 − (1/e), is op-
timal in the high-precision limit ǫ, δ → 0 if there is no
restriction on the accessible measurements. In this case
we have
N(ǫ, δ, λ = e−1) ≈ eǫ−1 ln δ−1. (82)
Compared with the minimum number ǫ−1 ln δ−1 for the
nonadversarial scenario, the overhead is only e times.
Although we cannot find a value of λ that is optimal
for all ǫ and δ, the optimal value usually lies in a neigh-
borhood, say [0.32, 0.38], of 1/e for the values of ǫ and δ
that are of practical interest, say ǫ, δ ≤ 0.1. In addition,
N(ǫ, δ, λ) varies quite slowly with λ in this neighborhood,
as illustrated in Fig. 4. So the choice λ = 1/e is usually
nearly optimal even if it is not optimal.
The above analysis shows that the optimal strategies
for the adversarial scenario are very different from the
counterpart for the nonadversarial scenario. As a con-
sequence, entangling measurements are less helpful and
often unnecessary for constructing the optimal strategies
in the case of bipartite and multipartite systems. In the
case of bipartite pure states for example, the optimal
strategies for high-precision verification can be realized
by virtue of local projective measurements [40, 41, 43, 44]
(cf. Sec. X).
2. Optimal strategies in the limit δ → 0
Here we discuss briefly the scenario in which δ → 0,
but ǫ is not necessarily so small, which is relevant to
entanglement detection [43]. According to Eq. (77), in
this case, the performance of the homogeneous strategy
Ω is characterized by
N (ǫ, λ) := lim
δ→0
N(ǫ, δ, λ)
ln δ−1
=
F + λǫ
λǫ lnλ−1
, (83)
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FIG. 5. Optimal homogeneous strategy in the limit δ → 0.
Here λ∗(ǫ) denotes the value of λ that minimizes N (ǫ, λ) de-
fined in Eq. (83), which determines the number of required
tests. N¯∗(ǫ) denotes the number of required tests normalized
with respect to the benchmark, as defined in Eq. (88).
where F = 1 − ǫ. The partial derivative of N (ǫ, λ) over
λ reads
N (ǫ, λ)
∂λ
=
F + λǫ + F lnλ
λ2ǫ(lnλ)2
. (84)
For a given ǫ or F , the minimum of N (ǫ, λ) over λ is
denoted by N∗(ǫ). It is attained when λ = λ∗(ǫ), where
λ∗(ǫ) is the unique solution of the equation
F + λǫ+ F lnλ = 0, (85)
which amounts to the equality
F =
λ
ln λ−1 + λ− 1 . (86)
It is not difficult to verify that λ∗(ǫ) = 0 when ǫ = 1
(F = 0) and λ∗(ǫ) = 1/e when ǫ = 0 (F = 1); in addition,
λ∗(ǫ) decreases monotonically with ǫ and is concave in ǫ,
as illustrated in Fig. 5. Therefore,
e−1F ≤ λ∗(ǫ) ≤ e−1. (87)
Next, we study the dependence of the efficiency on
the parameter λ. As a benchmark, we choose the ho-
mogeneous strategy with λ = 1/e in which case we have
N (ǫ, λ = e−1) = (eF + ǫ)/ǫ. Define
N¯ (ǫ, λ) := N (ǫ, λ)N (ǫ, e−1) , N¯∗(ǫ) :=
N∗(ǫ)
N (ǫ, e−1) . (88)
Straightforward calculation shows that
N¯ (ǫ, λ) = F + λǫ
(eF + ǫ)λ lnλ−1
. (89)
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When λ < 1/e, N¯ (ǫ, λ) decreases monotonically with ǫ,
so we have
1
lnλ−1
≤ N¯ (ǫ, λ) ≤ 1
eλ lnλ−1
. (90)
In addition, a homogeneous strategy Ω with a small value
of λ could be significantly more efficient than the bench-
mark when ǫ is large. When λ > 1/e, by contrast, N¯ (ǫ, λ)
increases monotonically with ǫ, so we have
1
eλ lnλ−1
≤ N¯ (ǫ, λ) ≤ 1
lnλ−1
. (91)
Finally, by virtue of Eqs. (83) and (86) we can derive
the following equality,
N¯∗(ǫ) := 1
eλ∗(ǫ)− lnλ∗(ǫ)− 1 . (92)
According to the analysis on λ∗(ǫ), we can deduce that
N¯∗(ǫ) decreases monotonically with ǫ; it approaches 1 in
the limit ǫ → 0, while it approaches 0 (quite slowly) in
the limit ǫ→ 1, as illustrated in Fig. 5. Although N¯∗(ǫ)
could be arbitrarily small when ǫ is large, it is close to
1 when ǫ is not too large. For example, N¯∗(ǫ) ≥ 0.965
when ǫ ≤ 0.5 and N¯∗(ǫ) ≥ 0.999 when ǫ ≤ 0.1. Therefore,
the homogeneous strategy Ω with β(Ω) = 1/e is nearly
optimal for most parameter range of practical interest,
as pointed out earlier.
VII. SINGLE-COPY VERIFICATION
In this section we analyze the possibility of QSV in the
adversarial scenario using a single test. This problem is
of intrinsic interest to single-copy entanglement detection
[43, 53]. Given a verification strategyΩ, the state |Ψ〉 can
be verified within infidelity 0 < ǫ < 1 and significance
level 0 < δ < 1 using a single test iff
F (N = 1, δ,Ω) ≥ 1− ǫ. (93)
Since F (N, δ,Ω) = ζ(N, δ,Ω)/δ according to Eq. (36),
the above equation is equivalent to
ζ(N = 1, δ,Ω) ≥ δ(1 − ǫ). (94)
So our main task here is to determine ζ(N, δ, λ) in the
case N = 1. In the rest of this section we assume N = 1
except when stated otherwise. Note that the range of δ
of practical interest usually satisfies 0 < δ ≤ 1/2.
A. Single-copy verification with homogeneous
strategies
First, let us consider the homogeneous strategy Ω de-
fined in Eq. (45).
Proposition 2. Suppose N = 1 and 0 ≤ λ < 1, then
ζ(N, δ, λ) =


0 0 ≤ δ ≤ λ,
λ(δ−λ)
1−λ λ ≤ δ ≤ 1+λ2 ,
δ(2−λ)−1
1−λ
1+λ
2 ≤ δ ≤ 1.
(95)
Proposition 2 follows from Eq. (51) when λ = 0 and
follows from Theorem 2 when 0 < λ < 1. Equation (95)
above can also be expressed as
ζ(N, δ, λ) = max
{
0,
λ(δ − λ)
1− λ ,
δ(2− λ)− 1
1− λ
}
. (96)
Based on this expression, we can derive
max
λ
ζ(N, δ, λ) = max{2− 2√1− δ − δ, 2δ − 1}
=
{
2− 2√1− δ − δ 0 ≤ δ ≤ 59 ,
2δ − 1 59 ≤ δ ≤ 1.
(97)
Here the maximum is attained at
λ =
{
1−√1− δ 0 ≤ δ ≤ 59 ,
0 59 ≤ δ ≤ 1.
(98)
In addition, the optimal solution λ is unique for 0 < δ < 1
except when δ = 5/9, in which case there are two optimal
solutions, namely, λ = 0 and λ = 1/3. Therefore, the
target state can be verified within infidelity 0 < ǫ < 1
and significance level 0 < δ < 1 using a single test iff δ
and ǫ satisfy the condition
δ(1− ǫ) ≤ max{2− 2√1− δ − δ, 2δ − 1}, (99)
Recall that the optimal strategy can always be chosen to
be homogeneous if there is no restriction on the measure-
ments.
Corollary 5. Given a homogeneous strategy Ω with
β(Ω) = λ, the target state can be verified within infidelity
0 < ǫ < 1 and significance level 0 < δ ≤ 1/2 in the
adversarial scenario using a single test iff
λ(δ − λ)
1− λ ≥ δ(1− ǫ). (100)
This requirement is equivalent to the following condi-
tions,
δ ≥ 4(1− ǫ)
(2− ǫ)2 , (101)
λ− ≤ λ ≤ λ+, (102)
where
λ± :=
(2− ǫ)δ ±√(2− ǫ)2δ2 − 4(1− ǫ)δ
2
. (103)
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FIG. 6. (color online) Single-copy verification in the adver-
sarial scenario and nonadversarial scenario. The target state
can be verified within infidelity ǫ and significance level δ in
the adversarial (nonadversarial) scenario using a single test
if the value of δ lies above the blue solid (red dashed) line;
cf. Eqs. (110) and (5).
Equation (100) above implies that 0 < λ < δ ≤ 1/2.
Therefore, any homogeneous strategy Ω with β(Ω) = 0
or β(Ω) ≥ 1/2 cannot verify the target state within infi-
delity 0 < ǫ < 1 and significance level 0 < δ ≤ 1/2 using
a single test. This conclusion also applies to an arbitrary
strategy, not necessarily homogeneous; see Corollary 6
below. The right hand side in Eq. (101) is monotonically
decreasing in ǫ for 0 < ǫ ≤ 1. Given the assumption
δ ≤ 1/2, Eq. (101) can be satisfied only if ǫ ≥ 2(√2− 1).
By computing the derivatives over δ, ǫ, it is easy to ver-
ify that λ+ (λ−) defined in Eq. (103) is monotonically
increasing (decreasing) in δ and ǫ, which agrees with the
intuition. In conjunction with the assumption δ ≤ 1/2,
we conclude that
2− ǫ−√ǫ2 + 4ǫ− 4
4
≤λ−≤λ+≤ 2− ǫ+
√
ǫ2 + 4ǫ− 4
4
.
(104)
Applying the inequality 4(1−ǫ)δ > 4(1−ǫ)δ2 in Eq. (103),
we can derive
(1− ǫ)δ < λ− ≤ λ+ < δ. (105)
B. Single-copy verification with general strategies
Next, we generalize Proposition 2 to an arbitrary ver-
ification operator Ω. The following theorem shows that
the efficiency of Ω is determined by β and τ , where β and
τ denote the second largest and the smallest eigenvalues
of Ω, respectively. See Appendix D for a proof.
Theorem 4. Suppose N = 1. If β ≥ 1/2, then
ζ(N, δ,Ω) =


0 δ ≤ β,
β(δ−β)
1−β β ≤ δ ≤ 1+β2 ,
δ(2−β)−1
1−β
1+β
2 ≤ δ ≤ 1.
(106)
If β < 1/2, then
ζ(N, δ,Ω) =


0 δ ≤ β,
τ(δ−β)
1+τ−2β β ≤ δ ≤ 1+τ2 ,
δ − 12 1+τ2 ≤ δ ≤ 1+β2 ,
δ(2−β)−1
1−β
1+β
2 ≤ δ ≤ 1.
(107)
Corollary 6. The target state can be verified by the
strategy Ω within infidelity 0 < ǫ < 1 and significance
level 0 < δ ≤ 1/2 using a single test iff
0 < β < δ,
τ(δ − β)
1 + τ − 2β ≥ δ(1− ǫ). (108)
When 0 < β < 1/2, we have
τ(δ − β)
1 + τ − 2β ≤ min
{
β(δ − β)
1− β ,
τ(δ − τ)
1− τ
}
. (109)
So Eq. (108) implies Eq. (100) with λ = β or λ = τ , which
in turn implies Eq. (101) and the sequence of inequalities
λ− ≤ τ ≤ β ≤ λ+, where λ± are defined in Eq. (103).
By virtue of Eq. (99) and Theorem 4 we can deduce
the following result.
Corollary 7. The target state can be verified within
infidelity 0 < ǫ < 1 and significance level 0 < δ < 1
in the adversarial scenario using a single test iff δ and ǫ
satisfy the condition
δ ≥ min
{
4(1− ǫ)
(2 − ǫ)2 ,
1
1 + ǫ
}
=
{
1
1+ǫ 0 < ǫ ≤ 45 ,
4(1−ǫ)
(2−ǫ)2
4
5 ≤ ǫ < 1.
(110)
When the lower bound is saturated, the target state can
be verified within infidelity ǫ and significance level δ by
a strategy Ω iff Ω is homogeneous and
β(Ω) = λ =
{
0 0 < ǫ ≤ 45 ,
2−2ǫ
2−ǫ
4
5 ≤ ǫ < 1.
(111)
When 0 < ǫ < 1 and ǫ 6= 4/5, the optimal strat-
egy Ω in Corollary 7 is unique and the conclusion can be
derived from Eq. (99) alone without resorting to Theo-
rem 4. When ǫ = 4/5, there are two optimal strategies,
both of which are homogeneous, and β(Ω) can take on
two possible values, namely, β(Ω) = 0 and β(Ω) = 1/3.
The parameter range of single-copy verification in
Eq. (110) contrasts with the counterpart in Eq. (5) for
the nonadversarial scenario, as illustrated in Fig. 6.
VIII. EFFICIENCIES OF GENERAL
VERIFICATION STRATEGIES
In this section we present our main results on the effi-
ciencies of general verification strategies. As we shall see
shortly, the efficiency of a general verification operator Ω
of a pure state |Ψ〉 is mainly determined by its second
largest eigenvalue β (or equivalently ν = 1 − β) and the
smallest eigenvalue τ .
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A. Singular verification strategies
The efficiency of a singular verification strategy is char-
acterized by Lemma 7 and Theorem 5 below, which are
proved in Appendix E. Define
δ∗ :=
1 +Nβ
N + 1
=
1 +N(1− ν)
N + 1
. (112)
Lemma 7. Suppose Ω is a singular verification operator
and 1/(N + 1) ≤ δ ≤ δ∗. Then
F (N, δ,Ω) ≤ 1− 1
δ(N + 1)
. (113)
Theorem 5. Suppose 0 < δ ≤ 1 and 0 < ν ≤ 1. Then
F (N, δ,Ω) ≥ 1− 1− δ
Nδν
, (114)
and the inequality is saturated when δ∗ ≤ δ ≤ 1. If in
addition ν ≥ 1/2, then
F (N, δ,Ω) ≥ 1− 1
δ(N + 1)
, (115)
and the inequality is saturated when Ω is singular and δ
satisfies 1/(N + 1) ≤ δ ≤ δ∗.
The bound in Eq. (114) is positive and thus nontrivial
if δ > 1/(Nν + 1), while the one in Eq. (115) is positive
if δ > 1/(N + 1). The first bound is saturated and thus
optimal when δ ≥ δ∗, while the second bound is better
when δ < δ∗. The two bounds coincide when δ = δ∗.
The bound in Eq. (115) under the condition ν ≥ 1/2 was
also given in Ref. [14] under a slightly different situation.
According to Lemma 7 and Theorem 5, if Ω is singular,
then
F (N, δ,Ω) ≤ max
{
0, 1− 1− δ
Nδν
, 1− 1
δ(N + 1)
}
. (116)
If ν ≥ 1/2, by contrast, then the above inequality is
reversed,
F (N, δ,Ω) ≥ max
{
0, 1− 1− δ
Nδν
, 1− 1
δ(N + 1)
}
. (117)
If Ω is singular and meanwhile ν ≥ 1/2, then the inequal-
ities in Eqs. (116) and (117) are saturated.
Corollary 8. Suppose 0 < ǫ, δ < 1 and 0 < ν ≤ 1.
Then
N(ǫ, δ,Ω) ≤
⌈
1− δ
νδǫ
⌉
. (118)
If Ω is singular, then
N(ǫ, δ,Ω) ≥ min
{⌈
1− δ
νδǫ
⌉
,
⌈
1
δǫ
− 1
⌉}
, (119)
If ν ≥ 1/2, then
N(ǫ, δ,Ω) ≤ min
{⌈
1− δ
νδǫ
⌉
,
⌈
1
δǫ
− 1
⌉}
. (120)
Corollary 8 is an easy consequence of Theorem 5 and
Eqs. (116), (117). If Ω is singular and ν ≥ 1/2, then the
inequalities in Eqs. (119) and (120) are saturated, so we
have
N(ǫ, δ,Ω) = min
{⌈
1− δ
νδǫ
⌉
,
⌈
1
δǫ
− 1
⌉}
, (121)
which generalizes Eq. (52). The number of tests charac-
terized by the upper bound in Eq. (118) is much smaller
than what can be achieved by previous approaches that
are based on quantum de Finetti theorem [19, 51]. Never-
theless, the scaling with 1/δ is still suboptimal compared
with the counterpart for the nonadversarial scenario.
B. Nonsingular verification strategies
Next, we provide an even better bound on the number
of tests when Ω is nonsingular. It should be pointed
out that many results derived for homogeneous strategies
cannot be applied directly to general strategies, so here
we have to resort to a different approach. Lemma 8 and
Theorem 6 below are proved in Appendix F.
Lemma 8. Suppose 0 < δ, f ≤ 1 and Ω is a positive
definite verification operator. Then
F (N, δ,Ω) ≥ N + 1− (lnβ)
−1 ln(τδ)
N + 1− (lnβ)−1 ln(τδ)− h ln(τδ) , (122)
F(N, f,Ω) ≥ N + 1− (ln β)
−1 ln f
N + 1− (lnβ)−1 ln f − h ln f , (123)
where
h = h(Ω) := max
j≥2
(
λj lnλ
−1
j
)−1
=
[
min{β lnβ−1, τ ln τ−1}]−1. (124)
Define
β˜ :=
{
β, β lnβ−1 ≤ τ ln τ−1,
τ, β lnβ−1 > τ ln τ−1.
(125)
Then we have h =
(
β˜ ln β˜−1
)−1
. Note that the lower
bounds in Eqs. (122) and (123) increase monotonically
with N , which is expected in view of Lemma 5. Lemma 8
is a key to studying QSV in the adversarial scenario.
Theorem 6. Suppose 0 < ǫ, δ < 1 and Ω is a positive
definite verification operator. Then
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N(ǫ, δ,Ω) ≥ N(ǫ, δ, λj) ≥ k−(λj) +
⌊
k−(λj)F
λjǫ
⌋
, j = 2, 3, . . . , D, (126)
k−(β˜) +
⌊
k−(β˜)F
β˜ǫ
⌋
≤ N(ǫ, δ,Ω) ≤
⌈
hF ln(Fδ)−1
ǫ
+
ln(Fδ)
lnβ
− 1
⌉
<
h ln(Fδ)−1
ǫ
, (127)
N(ǫ, δ,Ω) ≤
⌈
hF ln(τδ)−1
ǫ
+
ln(τδ)
lnβ
− 1
⌉
<
h ln(τδ)−1
ǫ
, (128)
where λj are the eigenvalues of Ω, F = 1 − ǫ, k−(λj) =
⌊ln δ/ lnλj⌋ for j = 2, 3, . . . , D, k−(β˜) = ⌊ln δ/ ln β˜⌋, and
h =
(
β˜ ln β˜−1
)−1
, with β˜ defined in Eq. (125).
The upper bounds in Eq. (127) are worse than that
in Eq. (128) if F < τ = τ(Ω), while they are better if
F > τ , which is usually the case for high precision veri-
fication. Suppose τ is bounded from below by a positive
constant. Then the ratio of the lower bound over the up-
per bound in Eq. (127) approaches 1 in the high-precision
limit ǫ, δ → 0, so the two bounds are nearly tight, as in
the case of homogeneous strategies. Therefore, N(ǫ, δ,Ω)
can be approximated as follows,
N(ǫ, δ,Ω) ≈ h ln(δ
−1)
ǫ
=
ln δ
ǫβ˜ ln β˜
. (129)
The number of tests has the same scaling behaviors with
ǫ−1 and δ−1 as the counterpart for the nonadversarial
scenario presented in Eqs. (2) and (12), except for an
overhead characterized by νh. However, Ω is not efficient
when τ is too small according to Eq. (126) as well as
Eqs. (72) and (73). In addition, the scaling behavior
with δ−1 would be worse if Ω were singular according to
Eq. (119).
The above analysis can be extended to the scenario in
which we want to verify whether the support of the resul-
tant state belongs to a certain subspace K. In this case,
we need to replace the projector |Ψ〉〈Ψ| by the projector
P onto the subspace K, impose the condition ElP = P ,
and redefine fρ as tr[(Ω
⊗N ⊗P )ρ]. Such extension is use-
ful when we want to verify whether the resultant state is
correctable in a fault-tolerant way [15].
IX. GENERAL RECIPE TO VERIFYING PURE
STATES IN THE ADVERSARIAL SCENARIO
According to Sec. VIII, the number N(ǫ, δ,Ω) of tests
required to verify a pure state in the adversarial scenario
has the same scaling behavior with ǫ−1 and δ−1 as the
counterpart for the nonadversarial scenario as long as the
verification operator Ω is nonsingular, and its smallest
eigenvalue τ is bounded from below by a positive con-
stant. However, the scaling behavior of N(ǫ, δ,Ω) with δ
is suboptimal when Ω is singular, that is, τ = 0. Sim-
ilarly, the efficiency is limited when τ is nonzero, but
very small. Here we provide a simple recipe to reducing
the number of tests significantly, so that pure states can
be verified in the adversarial scenario with high precision
and with nearly the same efficiency as in the nonadversar-
ial scenario. Surprisingly, all we need to do is to perform
the trivial test with a suitable probability. By “trivial
test” we mean the test whose test projector P is equal to
the identity operator, that is P = 1, so that all the states
can pass the test with certainty.
A. The recipe
Suppose Ω is a verification operator for the pure state
|Ψ〉. Based on Ω, we can construct a new verification
operator as follows,
Ωp = (1− p)Ω + p, 0 ≤ p < 1, (130)
which means the trivial test is performed with probability
0 ≤ p < 1 and Ω is performed with probability 1 − p.
Denote by βp and τp the second largest eigenvalue and
smallest eigenvalue of Ωp, respectively. Then
βp = (1− p)β + p, τp = (1 − p)τ + p, (131)
where β and τ are the second largest eigenvalue and
smallest eigenvalue of Ω, respectively, which satisfy the
inequality τ ≤ β. Here we view βp as a function of
ν = 1− β and p.
According to Sec. II, the trivial test can only decrease
the efficiency in the nonadversarial scenario. In high-
precision verification for example, the number of tests
required by Ωp is about 1/(1 − p) times the number re-
quired by Ω according to Eqs. (2) and (12). In sharp
contrast, the trivial test can increase the efficiency in
the adversarial scenario by hedging the influence of small
eigenvalues of Ω. Therefore, Ωp is called a hedged verifi-
cation operator of Ω.
By Eq. (127), to verify |Ψ〉 within infidelity ǫ and sig-
nificance level δ in the adversarial scenario, the number
of tests required by the strategy Ωp (assuming τp > 0)
satisfies
N(ǫ, δ,Ωp) <
h(p, ν, τ) ln(Fδ)−1
ǫ
, (132)
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where F = 1− ǫ and
h(p, ν, τ) = h(Ωp) =
[
min
{
βp lnβ
−1
p , τp ln τ
−1
p
}]−1
.
(133)
Compared with the number in Eq. (2) for the nonadver-
sarial scenario, the overhead is upper bounded as follows,
N(ǫ, δ,Ωp)
NNA(ǫ, δ,Ω)
< νh(p, ν, τ)
ln(1 − νǫ)−1 ln(Fδ)
νǫ ln δ
. (134)
It is straightforward to verify that this bound decreases
monotonically with 1/ǫ and 1/δ. It turns out that the
bound also decreases monotonically with 1/ν according
to Lemmas 9 and 10 below. When ǫ and δ approach zero,
the bound in Eq. (132) becomes tight (with respect to the
relative deviation) according to Eq. (127), so we have
lim
ǫ,δ→0
N(ǫ, δ,Ωp)
NNA(ǫ, δ,Ω)
= νh(p, ν, τ). (135)
This equation corroborates the significance of the func-
tion νh(p, ν, τ) for characterizing the overhead of high-
precision QSV in the adversarial scenario.
To construct an efficient hedged verification strategy,
we need to choose a suitable value of p so as to minimize
h(p, ν, τ). Given the value of ν = 1 − β and τ with
ν+ τ ≤ 1, the minimum of h(p, ν, τ) over p is denoted by
h∗(ν, τ); the unique minimizer in p is denoted by p∗(ν, τ)
or p∗ for simplicity; cf. Fig. 7. By definition we have
h(p∗, ν, τ) = h∗(ν, τ) := min
0≤p<1
h(p, ν, τ). (136)
In addition, it is straightforward to verify that
p∗ = min
{
p ≥ 0|βp ≥ e−1 & τp ln τ−1p ≥ βp lnβ−1p
}
.
(137)
Here the condition βp ≥ e−1 is required when τ = β
(so that Ω is a homogeneous strategy), but is redundant
when τ < β. Equation (137) implies that βp∗ ≥ 1/e; by
contrast, τp∗ ≤ 1/e if τ ≤ 1/e.
When the strategy Ω is homogeneous, that is, when
τ = β = 1− ν, we have
p∗(ν, 1− ν) =
{
0 0 < ν ≤ 1− 1e ,
eν−e+1
eν 1− 1e ≤ ν ≤ 1;
(138)
h∗(ν, 1− ν) =
{
(β lnβ−1)−1 0 < ν ≤ 1− 1e ,
e 1− 1e ≤ ν ≤ 1.
(139)
In this case Ωp is also homogeneous, so the results pre-
sented in Sec. VI can be applied directly. In general, it
is not easy to derive an analytical formula for p∗, but it
is very easy to determine p∗ numerically.
0
0.2
0.4
p
∗
(ν
,τ
)
ν
0
5
10
h
∗
(ν
,τ
)
0 0.5 1
ν
1
1.5
2
2.5
ν
h
∗
(ν
,τ
)
τ = 0
τ = β/10
τ = β/3
τ = β
FIG. 7. (color online) The optimal probability p∗(ν, τ ) for
performing the trivial test (upper plot), the prefactor h∗(ν, τ )
(middle plot), and the overhead νh∗(ν, τ ) (lower plot) for
high-precision QSV in the adversarial scenario.
B. Properties of hedged verification strategies
To determine the overhead of QSV in the adversarial
scenario, we need to clarify the properties of h(p, ν, τ),
h∗(ν, τ), and p∗(ν, τ), which affect the performances of
hedged verification strategies. To this end, it is instruc-
tive to recall that the function x lnx−1 is concave in
the interval 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 and is strictly increasing in
x when 0 ≤ x ≤ 1/e, while it is strictly decreasing
when 1/e ≤ x ≤ 1; it attains the maximum 1/e when
x = 1/e. These observations yield a tight lower bound
for h(p, ν, τ), namely,
h(p, ν, τ) ≥ e, (140)
and the bound is saturated iff τp = βp = 1/e, that is,
τ = 1− ν ≤ 1/e and p = (eν − e+ 1)/(eν); cf. Eqs. (138)
and (139).
Lemma 9. Suppose 0 < ν ≤ 1. Then p∗(ν, 1 − ν) is
nondecreasing in ν, h∗(ν, 1 − ν) is nonincreasing in ν,
and νh∗(ν, 1 − ν) is strictly increasing in ν. Meanwhile,
νh∗(ν, 1 − ν) > 1 and limν→0 νh∗(ν, 1 − ν) = 1. If in
addition 0 ≤ p < 1 and βp = 1 − ν + pν > 0, then
νh(p, ν, 1− ν) is strictly increasing in ν.
Lemma 10. Suppose ν and τ satisfy the following con-
ditions 0 < ν ≤ 1, 0 ≤ τ < 1, and ν + τ ≤ 1. Then
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FIG. 8. (color online) The optimal probability p∗(ν) for per-
forming the trivial test in high-precision QSV and a pretty-
good approximation p0(ν) (upper plot). Variations of νh∗(ν)
and its upper bound νh(p0(ν), ν) with ν (lower plot). The
black solid curve in the lower plot represents the first upper
bound for νh(p0(ν), ν) presented in Eq. (147).
1. p∗(ν, τ) is nondecreasing in ν and nonincreasing
in τ .
2. h∗(ν, τ) is nonincreasing in both ν and τ .
3. νh∗(ν, τ) > 1.
4. limν→0 νh∗(ν, τ) = 1.
5. νh∗(ν, τ) is strictly increasing in ν.
If in addition 0 ≤ p < 1 and τp = (1− p)τ + p > 0, then
6. h(p, ν, τ) is nonincreasing in both ν and τ .
7. νh(p, ν, τ) is strictly increasing in ν.
Lemmas 9 and 10 are proved in Appendix G. In
Lemma 10 we assume that ν and τ can vary indepen-
dently, which means the Hilbert space H on which Ω
acts has dimension at least 3. If H has dimension
2, then Ω is always homogeneous and τ = 1 − ν, so
Lemma 10 is redundant given Lemma 9. Lemmas 9 and
10 summarize the main properties of p∗(ν, τ), h(p, ν, τ),
and h∗(ν, τ) as illustrated in Fig. 7, which are very in-
structive to understanding QSV in the adversarial sce-
nario. In particular Lemma 10 reveals that the over-
head νh∗(ν, τ) in the number of tests becomes negligi-
ble when ν approaches 0. To be concrete, calculation
shows that νh∗(ν, τ) ≤ 1.09, 1.19, 1.31, 1.45, 1.61 when
ν ≤ 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, respectively.
When p∗(ν, τ) ≤ p ≤ p∗(ν) := p∗(ν, 0), Lemma 10
implies that
h∗(ν, 1− ν)≤h∗(ν, τ)≤h(p, ν, τ)≤h(p∗(ν), ν, τ)=h∗(ν).
(141)
Lemma 10 and Eq. (138) together yield a lower bound
and an upper bound for p∗(ν, τ),
p∗(ν, 1− ν) ≤ p∗(ν, τ) ≤ p∗(1− τ, τ) ≤ 1/e; (142)
the upper bound 1/e is saturated iff ν = 1 and τ = 0.
As a corollary, we have 1/[1− p∗(ν, τ)] ≤ e/(e− 1) < 1.6,
so the number of tests required by Ωp∗ is at most 60%
more than the number required by Ω for high-precision
verification in the nonadversarial scenario although here
we are mainly interested in the adversarial scenario. By
contrast, Lemma 10 and Eq. (139) yield a lower bound
for h∗(ν, τ),
h∗(ν, τ) ≥
{
(β lnβ−1)−1 0 < ν ≤ 1− 1e ,
e 1− 1e ≤ ν ≤ 1.
(143)
When 0 < τ < β and τ ln τ−1 ≥ β lnβ−1, Eq. (137)
implies that
p∗(ν, τ) = 0, h∗(ν, τ) = (β lnβ
−1)−1. (144)
So there is no need to perform the trivial test. When
τ ln τ−1 < β lnβ−1 (including the case τ = 0), which
implies that τ < 1/e, the probability p∗(ν, τ) happens to
be the unique solution of the equation
βp lnβp = τp ln τp, 0 < p < 1. (145)
In this case, it is beneficial to perform the trivial test with
a suitable probability. The inequality τ ln τ−1 < β lnβ−1
is thus an indication that τ is too small.
In view of Lemma 10, singular verification operator Ω
with τ = 0 is of special interest because the overhead
νh∗(ν, τ) for a given ν is maximized when τ = 0. In
this case, we can provide a pretty good approximation
for p∗(ν) = p∗(ν, 0), namely,
p0 = p0(ν) =
ν
e
=
1− β
e
, (146)
which is exact when ν = 1, as illustrated in Fig. 8. Let
h(p0, ν) := h(p0, ν, 0).
Lemma 11. Suppose 0 < ν ≤ 1; then h(ν/e, ν) de-
creases monotonically with ν, while νh(ν/e, ν) increases
monotonically with ν. In addition,
νh∗(ν) ≤ νh(ν/e, ν) ≤ (1− ν + e−1ν2)−1
≤ 1 + (e− 1)ν ≤ e. (147)
Lemma 11 is proved in Appendix G. Calculation shows
that the difference between νh(p0, ν) and νh∗(ν) is less
than 2% (cf. Fig. 8); therefore, p0 is indeed a good
approximation of p∗(ν). According to Lemma 10 and
Eq. (141), h∗(ν) is an upper bound for h∗(ν, τ) and
h(p, ν, τ) with p∗(ν, τ) ≤ p ≤ p∗(ν), while h(p0(ν), ν)
is an upper bound for h(p0(ν), ν, τ). So Lemma 11 has
implications for all verification operators, not necessarily
singular.
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C. Overhead of QSV in the adversarial scenario
QSV in the adversarial scenario is much more difficult
than the counterpart in the nonadversarial because the
device for preparing the quantum states is not trustwor-
thy. Therefore, more resource is required to achieve the
same precision, and the overhead compared with the non-
adversarial scenario is of fundamental interest. Now we
are ready to clarify this problem by virtue of the results
derived above. The following theorem is an implication
of Lemmas 10, 11, and Eq. (132).
Theorem 7. Suppose Ω is a verification operator for |Ψ〉, ν = ν(Ω), and τ = τ(Ω). If p = ν/e, then
N(ǫ, δ,Ωp) <
h(e−1ν, ν, τ) ln(Fδ)−1
ǫ
≤ h(e
−1ν, ν) ln(Fδ)−1
ǫ
≤ ln(Fδ)
−1
(1− ν + e−1ν2)νǫ ≤
(1 + eν − ν) ln(Fδ)−1
νǫ
, (148)
where F = 1− ǫ. If p∗(ν, τ) ≤ p ≤ p∗(ν), then
N(ǫ, δ,Ωp) <
h(p, ν, τ) ln(Fδ)−1
ǫ
≤ h∗(ν) ln(Fδ)
−1
ǫ
≤ h(e
−1ν, ν) ln(Fδ)−1
ǫ
. (149)
In conjunction with Eq. (2) or Eq. (134), Theorem 7 sets a general upper bound on the overhead of QSV in the
adversarial scenario. Let p = ν/e or p∗(ν, τ) ≤ p ≤ p∗(ν) for example; then
N(ǫ, δ,Ωp)
NNA(ǫ, δ,Ω)
< νh(e−1ν, ν)
ln(1 − νǫ)−1 ln(Fδ)
νǫ ln δ
≤ ln(1− νǫ)
−1 ln(Fδ)
(1− ν + e−1ν2)νǫ ln δ ≤
(1 + eν − ν) ln(1− νǫ)−1 ln(Fδ)
νǫ ln δ
. (150)
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FIG. 9. (color online) Upper bound on the ratio ofN(ǫ, δ,Ωp∗)
over NNA(ǫ, δ,Ω) according to the first bound in Eq. (150)
with δ = ǫ. This ratio characterizes the overhead of QSV in
the adversarial scenario.
By virtue of Lemmas 9 and 10, it is easy to verify
that all three bounds in Eq. (150) decrease monotoni-
cally with 1/ǫ, 1/δ, and 1/ν, as illustrated in Figs. 7-9.
Theorem 7 has profound implications for QSV in the ad-
versarial scenario. With the help of the trivial test, the
number of tests can achieve the same scaling behaviors
with ǫ−1 and δ−1 as the counterpart for the nonadver-
sarial scenario presented in Eq. (2) and Eq. (12). The
overhead is at most four times when ǫ, δ ≤ 1/4 and three
times when ǫ, δ ≤ 1/10; furthermore, the overhead be-
comes negligible when ν, ǫ, δ approach zero. It should be
emphasized that our recipe for addressing the adversar-
ial scenario is independent of the specific construction of
the verification protocol once the verification operator is
fixed. Moreover, the protocol for the adversarial scenario
requires the same measurement settings (except for the
trivial test) as employed for the nonadversarial scenario,
which is the best we can hope for. Therefore, pure states
can be verified in the adversarial scenario with nearly the
same efficiency as in the nonadversarial scenario with re-
spect to both the number of tests and the number of
measurement settings.
Although the performance of Ω is very sensitive to the
smallest eigenvalue τ , surprisingly, the performance of
Ωp∗ is not sensitive to τ at all. According to Lemma 10,
the difference between h∗(ν, τ1) and h∗(ν, τ2) for a given
ν is maximized when τ1 = 0 (cf. Eq. (147)) and τ2 = 1−ν
(cf. Eq. (139)). Calculation shows that the difference be-
tween h∗(ν) and h∗(ν, 1 − ν) is less than 12%, and it is
even smaller when ν is close to zero or close to 1, as il-
lustrated in Fig. 7. Therefore, the influence of τ on the
performance of Ωp∗ can be neglected to a large extent.
Moreover, the probability p for performing the trivial test
can be chosen without even knowing the value of τ , while
achieving nearly optimal performance. Actually, both the
choices p = p∗(ν) and p = p0(ν) = ν/e are nearly opti-
mal. These observations are very helpful to constructing
efficient verification protocols for the adversarial scenario
because we can focus on ν without worrying about the
impact of τ or even knowing the value of τ . Suppose Ω
is a verification operator with the largest possible ν (un-
der given conditions), then Ωp is guaranteed to be nearly
optimal, where p can be chosen to be p∗(ν, τ), p∗(ν), or
p0(ν) = ν/e. Without this insight, it would be much
more difficult to devise efficient verification protocols.
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X. APPLICATIONS
Our recipe presented in Sec. IX can be applied to ver-
ifying any pure state in the adversarial scenario as long
as we can construct a verification strategy for the non-
adversarial scenario. Here we summarize the applica-
tions of this recipe to verifying many important quantum
states, some of which have already appeared on arXiv
[43, 44, 48, 49]. The main results are shown in Table I.
Here all verification strategies are based on (adaptive) lo-
cal projective measurements together with classical com-
munication, which are most convenient for practical ap-
plications, although our general recipe for the adversarial
scenario is independent of how the verification strategy
is constructed.
A. Minimum measurement settings for verifying
multipartite pure states
Before considering specific quantum states, it is in-
structive to clarify the limitation of local measurements
in general. As a first step towards this goal, we determine
the minimum number of measurement settings for each
party required to verify a general multipartite pure state
that is genuinely multipartite entangled (GME). Recall
that a multipartite pure state is GME if it cannot be ex-
pressed as a tensor product of two pure states [3]. The
following proposition sets a fundamental lower bound for
the number of measurement settings required by each
party; see Appendix H for a proof.
Proposition 3. To verify a multipartite pure state with
adaptive local projective measurements, each party needs
at least two measurement settings, unless the party is not
entangled with other parties.
Here we do not assume that the test operators are pro-
jectors. In general many different test operators can be
constructed from a given measurement setting using dif-
ferent data-processing methods. If a party is not entan-
gled with other parties, then its reduced state is a pure
state and the party needs to perform only one projective
measurement with the pure state as a basis state.
As an implication of Proposition 3, each party needs at
least two measurement settings when the state is GME.
It turns out two measurement settings for each party
are also sufficient for verifying many important quantum
states, including bipartite maximally entangled states
[40, 41, 43], stabilizer states (including graph states)
[42, 48], hypergraph states [48], and Dicke states [50].
Nevertheless, more measurement settings can often im-
prove the efficiency with respect to the total number of
tests.
B. Maximally entangled states and GHZ states
First, consider bipartite maximally entangled states in
dimension d× d, which have the form
|Φ〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
j=0
|jj〉 (151)
up to local unitary transformations. According to
Ref. [40, 43], the maximal spectral gap of any verification
strategy Ω based on LOCC or separable measurements
is
ν(Ω) =
d
d+ 1
. (152)
The minimum number of tests required to verify |Φ〉
within infidelity ǫ and significance level δ in the non-
adversarial scenario is given by
NNA =
⌈
ln δ
ln[1− d(d+ 1)−1ǫ]
⌉
≤
⌈
d+ 1
dǫ
ln δ−1
⌉
. (153)
Here the upper bound is nearly tight when ǫ is small, so
we will neglect such small difference in favor of a simpler
expression in the following discussions. Moreover, the
verification operator Ω is necessarily homogeneous when
ν(Ω) attains the upper bound d/(d + 1). So the strat-
egy can be employed for fidelity estimation by Eq. (8).
According to Eq. (9), the standard deviation of this esti-
mation reads
∆F =
√
p(1− p)
ν(Ω)
√
N
=
√
(1 − F )(F + d−1)√
N
, (154)
where p = tr(Ωσ) = ν(Ω)F + β(Ω).
By adding the trivial test with a suitable probability,
any homogeneous strategy Ω with ν(Ω) ≤ d/(d+1) (that
is, β(Ω) ≥ 1/(d+1)) can be constructed using LOCC. In
particular, we can construct a homogeneous strategy Ω
with β(Ω) = 1/e, which is optimal for high-precision ver-
ification in the adversarial scenario according to Sec. VI.
Then the number of required tests satisfies
N ≤ ⌈eǫ−1 ln δ−1⌉ (155)
by Theorem 3. When δ ≤ 1/e, the above bound can be
strengthened by Eq. (76), which yields N < eǫ−1 ln δ−1.
This bound is nearly tight in the high-precision limit.
Equations (152)-(155) above also apply to the n-qudit
GHZ state for n ≥ 3 as shown in Ref. [47].
C. Bipartite pure states
Next, consider a general bipartite pure state of the
form |Ψ〉 = ∑d−1j=0 sj |jj〉, where the Schmidt coefficients
sj are arranged in decreasing order and satisfy the con-
dition
∑d−1
j=0 s
2
j = 1. When d = 2, by virtue of adap-
tive measurements with two-way communication, one can
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TABLE I. Verification of prominent bipartite and multipartite quantum states using local projective measurements. The second
column shows spectral gaps of efficient verification strategies for the nonadversarial scenario. The third column indicates whether
homogeneous strategies with given spectral gaps can be constructed. The last two columns show the numbers of tests required
to verify these states within infidelity ǫ and significance level δ in the nonadversarial scenario (NNA) and adversarial scenario
(N), respectively. Verification strategies for the adversarial scenario can be constructed using the recipe presented in Sec. IX.
Here d is the local dimension, n is the number of parties, and χ(G) is the chromatic number of the hypergraph or weighted
graph G. For bipartite pure states and stabilizer states, the table only shows the results in the worst case.
ν(Ω) homogeneous NNA N
max. entangled states d
d+1
yes ⌈ d+1
d
ǫ−1 ln δ−1⌉ ⌈eǫ−1 ln δ−1⌉
bipartite pure states 2
3
yes ⌈ 3
2
ǫ−1 ln δ−1⌉ ⌈eǫ−1 ln δ−1⌉
GHZ states d
d+1
yes ⌈ d+1
d
ǫ−1 ln δ−1⌉ ⌈eǫ−1 ln δ−1⌉
stabilizer states 1
2
yes ⌈2ǫ−1 ln δ−1⌉ ⌈2(ln 2)−1ǫ−1 ln δ−1⌉
qudit stabilizer states (d odd prime) d−1
d
yes ⌈ d
d−1
ǫ−1 ln δ−1⌉ ⌈eǫ−1 ln δ−1⌉
hypergraph states |G〉 χ(G)−1 no ⌈χ(G)ǫ−1 ln δ−1⌉ ⌊[χ(G) + e− 1]ǫ−1 ln δ−1⌋
weighted graph states |G〉 χ(G)−1 no ⌈χ(G)ǫ−1 ln δ−1⌉ ⌊[χ(G) + e− 1]ǫ−1 ln δ−1⌋
Dicke states (n = 3) 1
3
no ⌈3ǫ−1 ln δ−1⌉ ⌊4.1ǫ−1 ln δ−1⌋
Dicke states (n ≥ 4) (n− 1)−1 no ⌈(n− 1)ǫ−1 ln δ−1⌉ ⌊(n+ e− 2)ǫ−1 ln δ−1⌋
construct a verification operator Ω with spectral gap
(1 +
√
s0s1)
−1, which attains the maximum over sepa-
rable measurements [45]. For a general bipartite pure
state, the spectral gap achievable so far is [44, 46]
ν(Ω) =
2
2 + s20 + s
2
1
≥ 2
3
. (156)
With this strategy, the number of tests for the nonadver-
sarial scenario reads
NNA =
⌈
2 + s20 + s
2
1
2ǫ
ln δ−1
⌉
≤
⌈
3
2ǫ
ln δ−1
⌉
. (157)
Moreover, this strategy can be turned into a homoge-
neous strategy with the same spectral gap [44], which is
useful for fidelity estimation by Eq. (8). The standard
deviation of this estimation satisfies
∆F =
√
p(1− p)
ν(Ω)
√
N
≤
√
(1 − F )(F + 2−1)√
N
, (158)
where p = tr(Ωσ) = ν(Ω)F + β(Ω) and the inequality
follows from the inequality ν(Ω) ≥ 2/3, given that the
standard deviation decreases monotonically with ν.
By adding the trivial test with a suitable probability,
any homogeneous strategy Ω with ν(Ω) ≤ 2/(2+s20+s21)
can be constructed [44]. In particular, we can construct
a homogeneous strategy Ω with β(Ω) = 1/e [that is,
ν(Ω) = 1 − (1/e)], which is optimal for high-precision
verification in the adversarial scenario, so Eq. (155) also
applies to general bipartite pure states. Despite the sim-
plicity of bipartite pure states, we are not aware of any
other protocol for verifying them in the adversarial sce-
nario that does not rely on our result. Note that self-
testing can only verify a pure state up to some local
isometry [38, 39, 54], which is different from what we
consider here.
D. Stabilizer states
For stabilizer states, which are equivalent to graph
states under local Clifford transformations [55, 56], sev-
eral verification protocols are known in the literature
[37, 42]. The protocol introduced by PLM [42] is par-
ticularly efficient in terms of the total number of tests.
Recall that each n-qubit stabilizer state |G〉 is uniquely
determined by n commuting stabilizer generators in the
Pauli group, which generates the stabilizer group of or-
der 2n. The PLM protocol measures all 2n− 1 nontrivial
stabilizer operators of |G〉 with equal probability. The
resulting verification operator reads
ΩPLM = |G〉〈G| + 2
n−1 − 1
2n − 1 (1− |G〉〈G|), (159)
which is homogeneous with
β(ΩPLM) =
2n−1 − 1
2n − 1 ≤
1
2
, ν(ΩPLM) =
2n−1
2n − 1 ≥
1
2
.
(160)
To verify |G〉 within infidelity ǫ and significance level δ,
the number of tests required by this protocol is
⌈21−n(2n − 1)ǫ−1 ln δ−1⌉ ≤ ⌈2ǫ−1 ln δ−1⌉, (161)
which is almost independent of the number n of qubits
especially when n is large. Since the strategy in Eq. (159)
is homogeneous, it can also be used for fidelity estima-
tion by virtue of Eq. (8). The standard deviation of this
estimation satisfies
∆F =
√
p(1− p)
ν
√
N
≤
√
1− F 2√
N
(162)
given that ν ≥ 1/2, where p = tr(Ωσ) = νF + β.
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In the adversarial scenario, the strategy in Eq. (159) is
nearly optimal thanks to Theorem 3, and the number of
required tests satisfies
N ≤
⌈
ln δ
(β lnβ)ǫ
⌉
≤
⌈
2 ln δ−1
(ln 2)ǫ
⌉
<
⌈
2.89 ln δ−1
ǫ
⌉
, (163)
where β = β(ΩPLM). The second upper bound is inde-
pendent of the number of qubits and the specific stabi-
lizer state (or graph state). Moreover, the scaling behav-
iors in ǫ and δ are both optimal. Such a high efficiency
in the adversarial scenario is achieved for the first time.
Previously, the best protocol for the adversarial scenario
(without using our recipe) required ⌈m3/(δǫ)⌉ tests when
G is m-colorable [16, 48].
E. Qudit stabilizer states
Here we introduce an efficient protocol for verifying qu-
dit stabilizer states (including qudit graph states) with
the local dimension d being a prime, which generalizes
the PLM protocol [42]. Let |G〉 be a stabilizer state of
n-qudits. The stabilizer group S of |G〉 is composed of all
qudit Pauli operators that stabilize |G〉 and is isomorphic
to the group Znd , where Zd is the field of integers modulo
d. Note that Znd is also an n dimensional vector space over
Zd. The stabilizer group can be generated by n commut-
ing Pauli operators, say, K1,K2, . . . ,Kn, which satisfy
Kdr = 1 for r = 1, 2, . . . , n. Each stabilizer operator in S
has the form
∏n
r=1K
kr
r , where k := (k1, k2, . . . , kn) ∈ Znd .
If k 6= (0, 0, . . . , 0), then this stabilizer operator is equal
to the identity operator; otherwise, it has d distinct eigen-
values ωj for j = 0, 1, . . . , d − 1, where ω = e2πi/d is a
primitive dth root of unity.
For each nonzero element k in Znd we can construct
a test for |G〉 by measuring the stabilizer operator∏n
r=1K
kr
r : each party performs a Pauli measurement de-
termined by the decomposition of
∏n
r=1K
kr
r in terms of
local Pauli operators. The test is passed if the outcome
corresponds to the eigenspace of
∏n
r=1K
kr
r with eigen-
value 1. The corresponding test projector reads
Pk =
1
d
d−1∑
j=0
( n∏
r=1
Kkrr
)j
. (164)
Note that jk for j ∈ Zd will lead to the same measure-
ment and test operator. Moreover, Pk′ = Pk iff k
′ = jk
for some j ∈ Zd with j 6= 0 (this conclusion may fail if d is
not a prime, that is why we assume that d is a prime). So
each test corresponds to a line in Znd passing through the
origin, and vice versa. In total (dn − 1)/(d − 1) distinct
tests can be constructed in this way.
A verification protocol for |G〉 can be constructed by
performing all distinct tests Pk randomly each with prob-
ability (d− 1)/(dn − 1). The verification operator reads
Ω =
1
dn − 1
∑
k∈Zn
d
, k 6=(0,0,...,0)
Pk
= |G〉〈G| + d
n−1 − 1
dn − 1 (1 − |G〉〈G|), (165)
which is homogeneous with
β(Ω) =
dn−1 − 1
dn − 1 ≤
1
d
, ν(Ω) =
dn − dn−1
dn − 1 ≥
d− 1
d
.
(166)
The number of tests required by this protocol is⌈
dn − 1
dn − dn−1 ǫ
−1 ln δ−1
⌉
≤
⌈ d
d− 1ǫ
−1 ln δ−1
⌉
, (167)
which decreases monotonically with the local dimension
d. Surprisingly, qudit stabilizer states with d > 2 (as-
suming d is a prime) can be verified more efficiently than
qubit stabilizer states.
Similar to the qubit case, the above protocol can be
applied for fidelity estimation. The standard deviation
of this estimation satisfies
∆F =
√
p(1− p)
ν
√
N
≤
√
(1 − F )[F + (d− 1)−1]√
N
(168)
given that ν ≥ (d− 1)/d, where p = tr(Ωσ) = νF + β.
By adding the trivial test with a suitable probability
we can construct any homogeneous verification operator
Ω for |G〉 with dn−1−1dn−1 ≤ β(Ω) < 1. When d is an odd
prime, we can construct a homogeneous verification op-
erator Ω with β(Ω) = 1/e, which is optimal for the ad-
versarial scenario in the high-precision limit. Then the
number of required tests satisfies N ≤ ⌈eǫ−1 ln δ−1⌉ as in
Eq. (155).
F. Hypergraph states
A hypergraph graph G = (V,E) is characterized by a
set V of vertices and a set E of hyperedges [6, 7]. For
each hypergraphG, one can construct a hypergraph state
by preparing the state |+〉 = (|0〉+ |1〉)/√2 for each ver-
tex of G and then applying the generalized controlled-Z
operation on the vertices of each hyperedge e ∈ E [6, 7].
As a generalization of graph states, hypergraph states
are very useful to quantum computation and foundation
studies.
Recently, the authors proposed an efficient protocol—
the cover protocol—for verifying general hypergraph
states, which requires only two Pauli measurements for
each party [48]. As a special case, a coloring protocol
can be constructed for each coloring of the hypergraph
G. Suppose G has chromatic number χ(G); then the op-
timal coloring protocol requires only χ(G) distinct mea-
surement settings and can achieve a spectral gap of
ν(Ω) = χ(G)−1 ≥ n−1, (169)
23
where n is the number of qubits. Accordingly, the num-
ber of required tests reads
NNA =
⌈
χ(G)ǫ−1 ln δ−1
⌉ ≤ ⌈nǫ−1 ln δ−1⌉ . (170)
This performance is nearly optimal if the chromatic num-
ber χ(G) is small. For example, Union Jack states [18]
can be verified with a high efficiency since the chromatic
number of the underlying Union Jack lattice is only 3.
These states are particularly interesting because they can
realize universal quantum computation under Pauli mea-
surements [18].
By virtue of the general recipe presented in Sec. IX, we
can construct a hedged coloring protocol as characterized
by the verification operator Ωp with p = ν/e [48]. In the
adversarial scenario, the number of tests required by Ωp
satisfies
N ≤ [χ(G) + e− 1] ln(Fδ)
−1
ǫ
≤ (n+ e− 1) ln(Fδ)
−1
ǫ
,
(171)
where F = 1− ǫ. This bound is comparable to the coun-
terpart for the nonadversarial scenario especially when
n is large. This protocol is dramatically more efficient
than previous protocols for verifying hypergraph states
as proposed in Refs. [19, 51]. For example, the protocol
of Ref. [51] (which improves over Ref. [19]) requires more
than (2 ln 2)n3ǫ−18 tests when δ = ǫ and 4nǫ ≤ 1 (the
number of tests was derived only for a restricted param-
eter range) [48]. The hedged coloring protocol is instru-
mental to realizing verifiable blind quantum computa-
tion and quantum supremacy. Its high efficiency demon-
strates the power of the general recipe to constructing
efficient verification protocols for the adversarial scenario
proposed in this work.
Incidentally, the above results also apply to qudit hy-
pergraph states, including qudit graph states in partic-
ular [48]. In the case of graph states, the hedged col-
oring protocol is less efficient than the PLM protocol
[42] adapted for the adversarial scenario as discussed in
Sec. XD, but requires much fewer measurement settings.
G. Weighted graph states
Next, consider weighted graph states [57]. Recently,
Hayashi and Takeuchi introduced several efficient proto-
cols for verifying the weighted graph state |G〉 associated
with any weighted graph G [49]. One of their protocols
is based on a coloring of G and adaptive local projective
measurements. It can achieve the same spectral gap as
in Eq. (169), that is, ν(Ω) = χ(G)−1 ≥ n−1, where χ(G)
now refers to the chromatic number of the weighted graph
G. As in the case of hypergraph states, we can construct
a hedged coloring protocol characterized by the verifica-
tion operator Ωp with p = ν/e [48]. Then the number
of tests required by Ωp to verify |G〉 in the adversarial
scenario satisfies
N ≤ [χ(G) + e− 1] ln(Fδ)
−1
ǫ
≤ (n+ e− 1) ln(Fδ)
−1
ǫ
(172)
as in Eq. (171). So weighted graph states can be verified
with the same efficiency as hypergraph states. It should
be pointed out that the original protocol in Ref. [49] is
based on an earlier version of this paper for dealing with
the adversarial scenario [48], so the scaling behavior of
N with the significance level is suboptimal. The latest
results developed here as presented in Sec. IX are re-
quired to achieve the optimal scaling behavior shown in
Eq. (172). We are not aware of any other protocol for ver-
ifying weighted graph states in the adversarial scenario.
H. Dicke states
Dicke states are another important class of multipar-
tite quantum states which are useful for quantum metrol-
ogy. The n-qubit Dicke state with k excitations can be
expressed as follows,
|Dkn〉 =
(
n
k
)−1/2 ∑
x∈Bn,k
|x〉, (173)
whereBn,k denotes the set of strings in {0, 1}n with Ham-
ming weight k. To avoid trivial cases, here we assume
that n ≥ 3 and 1 ≤ k ≤ n − 1. The Dicke state reduces
to a W state when k = 1. Recently, Liu et al. [50] pro-
posed an efficient protocol for verifying the Dicke state,
which can achieve a spectral gap of
ν(Ω) =
{
1
3 n = 3,
1
n−1 n ≥ 4.
(174)
To verify the Dicke state within infidelity ǫ and signifi-
cance level δ, the number of required tests reads
NNA =
{⌈
3ǫ−1 ln δ−1
⌉
n = 3,⌈
(n− 1)ǫ−1 ln δ−1⌉ n ≥ 4. (175)
In the adversarial scenario, we can construct a hedged
verification strategy Ωp with p = ν/e by Sec. IX. Thanks
to Theorem 7, the number of tests required by Ωp satisfies
N ≤
{
4.1ǫ−1 ln δ−1 n = 3,
(n+ e− 2)ǫ−1 ln δ−1 n ≥ 4. (176)
This number is comparable to the counterpart for the
nonadversarial scenario. To the best of our knowledge, no
protocol is known previously for verifying general Dicke
states in the adversarial scenario.
To summarize the above discussions, by virtue of our
recipe presented in Sec. IX, optimal protocols for the ad-
versarial scenario can be constructed for all bipartite pure
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states, GHZ states, and qudit stabilizer states whose lo-
cal dimension is an odd prime. Nearly optimal protocols
can be constructed for qubit stabilizer states and those
hypergraph states with small chromatic numbers, includ-
ing Union Jack states. For general hypergraph states,
weighted graph states, and Dicke states, the number of
required tests is only about nǫ−1 ln δ−1 as shown in Ta-
ble I, which is dramatically smaller than what is required
by previous verification protocols (whenever such proto-
cols are available).
XI. COMPARISON WITH OTHER
APPROACHES
Before concluding this paper, it is instructive to com-
pare QSV with other approaches for estimating or verify-
ing quantum states, such as (traditional) quantum state
tomography [35], compressed sensing [36], direct fidelity
estimation (DFE) [37], self-testing [38, 39]. In this way
we hope to put QSV in a wide context, but we do not
intend to be exhaustive. Here we are mainly interested
in the efficiencies of these approaches with respect to the
total number of tests, measurements, or copies of the
state required to reach a given precision. Before such a
comparison, it should be pointed out that different ap-
proaches rely on different assumptions and address dif-
ferent problems. So it is impossible to make a completely
fair comparison.
In quantum state tomography, compressed sensing,
and DFE, we usually assume that the states prepared in
different runs are independent and identical and that the
measurement devices are trustworthy. In addition, many
protocols only require local projective measurements or
even Pauli measurements, which are usually much easier
to implement than other more complicated operations.
In QSV, the measurement devices are still trustworthy,
but the states for different runs may be different as long
as they are independent [42]. In the adversarial sce-
nario, arbitrary correlated or entangled state preparation
is allowed. In self-testing, even the measurement devices
are not trusted [38, 39]. The different strengths of as-
sumption underlying these approaches are illustrated in
Fig. 10.
In addition, different approaches address different
questions. Quantum state tomography aims to address
the following question: What is the state? To answer
this question amounts to reconstruct the density matrix,
so the number of parameters to be determined increases
exponentially with the number of qubits (here we as-
sume that each subsystem is a qubit for simplicity; the
general situation is similar). That is why the resource
overhead of tomography increases exponentially with the
number of qubits. Compressed sensing addresses a sim-
ilar question, and so cannot avoid the exponential scal-
ing of resource costs. Nevertheless, it can reduce the re-
source overhead significantly by exploiting the structure
of quantum states with low ranks [36].
FIG. 10. (color online) Qualitative comparison among various
approaches for estimating or verifying quantum states with
respect to the efficiency and strength of assumption. Thanks
to the recipe presented in Sec. IX, QSV in the adversarial
scenario can achieve nearly the same efficiency as QSV in the
nonadversarial scenario, although the underlying assumption
is much weaker.
DFE, QSV, and self-testing address a different type
of questions: Is the state identical to the target state,
or how close is it? Here the target state is usually a
pure state, and the closeness is usually quantified by fi-
delity or infidelity. Quite often answering these questions
is sufficient for many applications in quantum informa-
tion processing, so it is of fundamental interest to extract
such key information efficiently without full tomography.
DFE aims to determine the fidelity (infidelity) between
the state prepared and the target state [37]. QSV tries to
decide whether the fidelity (infidelity) is larger (smaller)
than a given threshold, which is usually easier than fi-
delity estimation [40–42]. Self-testing can only provide a
lower bound for the fidelity up to some local isometry be-
cause the measurement devices are not trustworthy, and
the conclusion is solely based on the observed probabili-
ties [38, 39].
Suppose we can optimize measurement settings and
data-processing procedures, then the efficiency of an ap-
proach is mainly determined by the strength of the un-
derlying assumption and the amount of information it
extracts. However, in general it is very difficult to deter-
mine the efficiency limit of a given approach because it is
very difficult to perform such optimization. In addition,
it is highly nontrivial to determine the impacts of various
assumptions.
Although DFE is much more efficient than quantum
state tomography, the resource cost still increases expo-
nentially with the number of qubits, except for some spe-
cial families of states, such as stabilizer states. The DFE
protocol originally proposed in Ref. [37] only requires
Pauli measurements; it is not clear if we can avoid the
exponential scaling behavior if more general local mea-
surements are taken into account. In the case of self-
testing, there are already numerous research works (see
the review paper Ref. [39]); however, little is known about
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the resource cost to reach a given precision, especially in
the multipartite setting. A few known protocols for self-
testing multipartite states are highly resource consum-
ing and hardly practical for systems of more than ten
qubits. For example, the resource required to self-test
Dicke states increases exponentially with the number of
qubits [58, 59]. It is still not clear whether this ineffi-
ciency is fundamentally inevitable or is due to our lack
of imagination.
In QSV in the nonadversarial scenario, we have shown
in Sec. III B that the variation in states prepared in dif-
ferent runs does not induce any resource overhead as long
as these states are independent of each other. In other
words, as far as the efficiency is concerned, we can as-
sume that these states are identical and independent as
assumed in quantum state tomography, compressed sens-
ing, and DFE. Moreover, thanks to our recipe presented
in Sec. IX, pure states can be verified in the adversarial
scenario with nearly the same efficiency as in the nonad-
versarial scenario. In many cases, we can even construct
optimal protocols, which are quite rare for other ap-
proaches. Therefore, we can expect that QSV even in the
adversarial scenario is more efficient than DFE and self-
testing, as illustrated in Fig. 10. This is indeed the case
for all states for which verification protocols have been
found, including bipartite pure states, GHZ states, stabi-
lizer states (including graph states), hypergraph states,
weighted graph states, and Dicke states. For exam-
ple, Dicke states, hypergraph states, and weighted graph
states can be verified efficiently in the adversarial sce-
nario, although no efficient DFE or self-testing protocols
are available. In the case of general hypergraph states
and weighted graph states, actually, no self-testing pro-
tocols are known at all.
As pointed out earlier, it would be unfair to compare
QSV with self-testing directly, but so far the former is the
only practical choice for intermediate and large quantum
systems especially in the adversarial scenario. Although
self-testing has been studied more intensively in the lit-
erature [39], it is still very difficult to construct efficient
self-testing protocols for multipartite states because the
measurement devices are not trustworthy. Insight from
QSV may be helpful to studying self-testing, and vice
versa. The relations between QSV and self-testing are
worth further exploration in the future. In particular, it
would be desirable to combine the merits of the two ap-
proaches. We hope that our work can stimulate further
progresses along this direction.
XII. SUMMARY
We presented a comprehensive study of pure-state ver-
ification in the adversarial scenario. Notably, we intro-
duced a general method for computing the main figures
of merit pertinent to QSV in the adversarial scenario,
such as the fidelity and the number of required tests. In
addition, we introduced homogeneous strategies and de-
rived analytical formulas for the main figures of merit
of practical interest. The conditions for single-copy ver-
ification are also clarified, which are instructive to un-
derstanding single-copy entanglement detection. More-
over, we proposed a simple but powerful recipe to con-
structing efficient verification protocols for the adversar-
ial scenario from the counterpart for the nonadversarial
scenario. Thanks to this recipe, any pure state can be
verified in the adversarial scenario with nearly the same
efficiency as in the nonadversarial scenario. Therefore, to
verify a pure quantum state efficiently in the adversarial
scenario, it remains to find an efficient protocol for the
nonadversarial scenario, which is usually much easier.
Our recipe can readily be applied to the verification
of many important quantum states in quantum infor-
mation processing, including bipartite pure states, GHZ
states, stabilizer states, hypergraph states, weighted
graph states, and Dicke states. Recently, efficient pro-
tocols have been constructed for verifying these states
in the nonadversarial scenario. By virtue of our recipe,
all these states can be verified in the adversarial scenario
with surprising high efficiencies. These results are instru-
mental to many quantum information processing tasks
that demand high security requirements, such as blind
MBQC and quantum networks. The potential of our
study is to be unleashed further in the future.
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APPENDIX
In this Appendix, we prove many results presented in
the main text, including Theorems 1-6, Lemmas 1-11,
and Proposition 3. We also present a simpler proof of
Eq. (1), which was originally proved in Ref. [42].
Appendix A: Proof of Eq. (1)
Here we present a simpler proof of Eq. (1), which was
originally proved in Ref. [42].
Proof. Suppose the verification operator Ω has spectral
decomposition Ω =
∑D
j=1 λjΠj , where D is the dimen-
sion of the Hilbert space H, λj are the eigenvalues of Ω
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arranged in decreasing order 1 = λ1 > λ2 ≥ · · · ≥ λD,
and Πj are mutually orthogonal rank-1 projectors with
Π1 = |Ψ〉〈Ψ|. Without loss of generality, we may as-
sume that σ is diagonal in the eigenbasis of Ω because
both tr(Ωσ) and 〈Ψ|σ|Ψ〉 only depend on the diagonal el-
ements of σ in this basis. Suppose σ =
∑D
j=1 xjΠj with
xj ≥ 0 and
∑
j xj = 1. Then
〈Ψ|σ|Ψ〉 = x1, tr(Ωσ) =
∑
j
λjxj . (A1)
Therefore,
max
〈Ψ|σ|Ψ〉≤1−ǫ
tr(Ωσ) = max
xj≥0,
∑
j
xj=1, x1≤1−ǫ
∑
j
λjxj
= max
0≤x1≤1−ǫ
x1 + λ2(1− x1) = 1− ν(Ω)ǫ, (A2)
where ν(Ω) := 1 − β = 1 − λ2. The maximum can be
attained when σ = (1− ǫ)(|Ψ〉〈Ψ|) + ǫΠ2.
Appendix B: Proofs of Lemmas 1 to 6
In this Appendix we prove Lemmas 1 to 6 presented
in Sec. V.
Proof of Lemma 1. Let ρ be an arbitrary permutation-
invariant diagonal density matrix on H⊗(N+1) with de-
composition ρ =
∑
k∈SN
ckρk, where ck form a probabil-
ity distribution on SN . Recall that SN is the set of all
sequences k = (k1, k2, . . . , kD) of D nonnegative integers
that sum up to N +1, that is,
∑
j kj = N +1. If fρ = 0,
then ζk(λ) = 0 whenever ck > 0. Therefore,
η(N, 0,Ω) = max
k∈SN
{ηk(λ) | ζk(λ) = 0}. (B1)
To compute η(N, 0,Ω), we need to determine those
k ∈ SN at which ζk(λ) = 0. According to Eq. (27), this
condition is satisfied iff k1 = 0, or λi = 0 and ki ≥ 1 for
some 2 ≤ i ≤ D. In the first case, ηk(λ) ≤ βN , and the
inequality is saturated when k = (0, N + 1, 0, . . . , 0). In
the second case,
ηk(λ) =
kiλ
ki−1
i
N + 1
∏
j 6=i,kj>0
λ
kj
j ≤
1
N + 1
, (B2)
and the inequality is saturated when k = (N, 0, . . . , 0, 1).
If τ > 0, then only the first case can occur, so we have
η(N, 0,Ω) = βN . If τ = 0, then both cases can occur,
so η(N, 0,Ω) = max{βN , 1/(N + 1)}. In conclusion, we
have η(N, 0,Ω) = δc, which confirms Lemma 1.
Next, consider the proofs of Lemmas 2 and 3. From
the definitions in Eqs. (20) and (34) we can deduce the
following equalities.
ζ(N, δ,Ω) = min
δ′≥δ
ζ˜(N, δ′,Ω), (B3a)
η(N, f,Ω) = max
f ′≤f
η˜(N, f ′,Ω), (B3b)
F (N, δ,Ω) = min
δ′≥δ
F˜ (N, δ′,Ω), (B3c)
F(N, f,Ω) = min
f ′≥f
F˜(N, f ′,Ω). (B3d)
Therefore, Lemmas 2 and 3 are immediate consequences
of Lemma 12 below.
Lemma 12. The following statements hold.
1. ζ˜(N, δ,Ω) is convex in δ for 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 and is strictly
increasing in δ for δc ≤ δ ≤ 1.
2. η˜(N, f,Ω) is concave and strictly increasing in f for
0 ≤ f ≤ 1.
3. F˜ (N, δ,Ω) is strictly increasing in δ for δc ≤ δ ≤ 1.
4. F˜(N, f,Ω) is strictly increasing in f for 0 < f ≤ 1.
Lemma 12 implies that the two functions ζ˜(N, δ,Ω)
and F˜ (N, δ,Ω) are nondecreasing in δ for 0 < δ ≤ 1,
given that the two functions are nonnegative and that
F˜ (N, δ,Ω) = ζ˜(N, δ,Ω) = 0 for 0 < δ ≤ δc. The convex-
ity of ζ˜(N, δ,Ω) means
ζ˜(N, δ,Ω) ≤ (1− s)ζ˜(N, δ1,Ω) + sζ˜(N, δ2,Ω) (B4)
for δ = (1 − s)δ1 + sδ2 and 0 ≤ s, δ1, δ2 ≤ 1. Note that
this inequality is trivial when δ1 = δ2 or s = 0, 1. The
concavity of η˜(N, f,Ω) means
η˜(N, (1−s)f1+sf2,Ω) ≥ (1−s)η˜(N, f1,Ω)+sη˜(N, f2,Ω)
(B5)
for 0 ≤ s, f1, f2 ≤ 1.
Proof of Lemma 12. The convexity of ζ˜(N, δ,Ω) in δ can
be proved by virtue of the definition in Eq. (34). Suppose
0 ≤ δ1 < δ2 ≤ 1 and 0 < s < 1; let δ = (1− s)δ1+ sδ2. If
δ1 > δc, then there exist two quantum states ρ1 and ρ2
that satisfy
pρ1 = δ1, fρ1 = ζ˜(N, δ1,Ω),
pρ2 = δ2, fρ2 = ζ˜(N, δ2,Ω).
(B6)
Let ρ = (1− s)ρ1 + sρ2; then
pρ = (1 − s)δ1 + sδ2 = δ, (B7)
so that
ζ˜(N, δ,Ω) ≤ fρ = (1− s)ζ˜(N, δ1,Ω) + sζ˜(N, δ2,Ω),
(B8)
which confirms Eq. (B4).
If δ1 ≤ δc and δ ≤ δc, then ζ˜(N, δ,Ω) = ζ˜(N, δ1,Ω) =
0, while ζ˜(N, δ2,Ω) ≥ 0, so Eq. (B4) holds.
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If δ1 ≤ δc and δ > δc, then ζ˜(N, δ1,Ω) = 0. Let ρc be
a quantum state that satisfies pρc = δc and fρc = 0. Let
s′ be the solution of the equation δ = (1 − s′)δc + s′δ2,
which satisfies s′ ≤ s. Let ρ = (1 − s′)ρc + s′ρ2. Then
pρ = δ, so that
ζ˜(N, δ,Ω) ≤ fρ = s′ζ˜(N, δ2,Ω) ≤ sζ˜(N, δ2,Ω)
= (1− s)ζ˜(N, δ1,Ω) + sζ˜(N, δ2,Ω), (B9)
which confirms Eq. (B4) again. Therefore, ζ˜(N, δ,Ω) is
convex in δ for 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1.
To prove the monotonicity of ζ˜(N, δ,Ω) with δ, let
δ1, δ2 be real numbers that satisfy δc ≤ δ1 < δ2 ≤ 1.
Then there exists a quantum state ρ2 such that pρ2 = δ2
and fρ2 = ζ˜(N, δ2,Ω) > 0. Let s be the solution to the
equation δ1 = (1 − s)δc + sδ2; then 0 ≤ s < 1. Let
ρ = (1− s)ρc + sρ2; then pρ = δ1, so that
ζ˜(N, δ1,Ω) ≤ fρ = sζ˜(N, δ2,Ω) < ζ˜(N, δ2,Ω). (B10)
It follows that ζ˜(N, δ,Ω) is strictly increasing in δ when
δc ≤ δ ≤ 1. As a corollary, ζ˜(N, δ,Ω) is nondecreasing in
δ for 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 given that ζ˜(N, δ,Ω) = 0 for 0 ≤ δ ≤ δc.
Next, consider statement 2 in Lemma 12. The con-
cavity of η˜(N, f,Ω) follows from a similar reasoning that
leads to Eq. (B8).
To prove the monotonicity of η˜(N, f,Ω) over f , choose
0 ≤ f1 < f2 ≤ 1. Then there exists a quantum state ρ1
such that fρ1 = f1 and pρ1 = η˜(N, f1,Ω) < 1. Choose
̺ = (|Ψ〉〈Ψ|)⊗(N+1); then f̺ = p̺ = 1. Let s be the
solution to the equation f2 = (1 − s)f1 + s; note that
0 < s ≤ 1 because of the assumption f1 < f2 ≤ 1. Let
ρ2 = (1− s)ρ1 + s̺; then fρ2 = f2, so that
η˜(N, f2,Ω) ≥ pρ2 = (1− s)η˜(N, f1,Ω) + s > η˜(N, f1,Ω).
(B11)
Here the second inequality follows from the facts that
0 < s ≤ 1 and that η˜(N, f1,Ω) < 1.
Next, consider statement 3 in Lemma 12. Suppose
δ1, δ2 are real numbers that satisfy δc ≤ δ1 < δ2 ≤ 1.
Then F˜ (N, δ2,Ω) > 0 and there exists a quantum state
ρ2 such that pρ2 = δ2 and fρ2 = δ2F˜ (N, δ2,Ω). By as-
sumption, δ1 can be expressed as a convex sum of δ2 and
δc, that is, δ1 = sδ2 + (1 − s)δc with 0 ≤ s < 1. Let
ρ1 = sρ2 + (1 − s)ρc, then
pρ1 = sδ2+(1−s)δc = δ1, fρ1 = sfρ2 = sδ2F˜ (N, δ2,Ω),
(B12)
so that
F˜ (N, δ1,Ω) ≤ fρ1
pρ1
=
sδ2F˜ (N, δ2,Ω)
sδ2 + (1− s)δc < F˜ (N, δ2,Ω).
(B13)
Therefore, F˜ (N, δ,Ω) is strictly increasing in δ whenever
δc ≤ δ ≤ 1.
Finally, consider statement 4 in Lemma 12. Suppose f1
and f2 are real numbers that satisfy 0 < f1 < f2 ≤ 1 and
let s = f1/f2. Then 0 < s < 1 and there exists a quantum
state ρ2 such that fρ2 = f2 and pρ2 = f2/F˜(N, f2,Ω).
Let ρ1 = sρ2 + (1 − s)ρc, where ρc is a quantum state
that satisfies pρc = δc and fρc = 0. Then we have
fρ1 = sf2 = f1, pρ1 = spρ2 + (1− s)δc, (B14)
so that
F˜(N, f1,Ω) ≤ sf2
spρ2 + (1− s)δc
<
f2
pρ2
= F˜(N, f2,Ω).
(B15)
Therefore, F˜(N, f,Ω) increases strictly monotonically
with f when 0 < f ≤ 1.
Proof of Lemma 4. To prove Eq. (39) in the lemma, let
f1 = ζ(N, δ,Ω) and δ1 = η(N, f1,Ω). If δ satisfies the
condition 0 ≤ δ ≤ δc, then f1 = 0 and δ1 = δc according
to Lemma 1, which confirms Eq. (39).
Now suppose δc < δ ≤ 1; then max{δ, δc} = δ. In
addition, there exists a quantum state ρ on H⊗(N+1)
such that pρ = δ and fρ = f1, which implies that
δ1 = η(N, f1,Ω) ≥ δ. Meanwhile, there exists a state
ρ′ such that fρ′ = f1 and pρ′ = δ1, which implies that
ζ(N, δ1,Ω) ≤ f1 = ζ(N, δ,Ω). Since ζ(N, δ,Ω) is strictly
increasing in δ for δc ≤ δ ≤ 1 according to Lemma 3,
we conclude that δ1 ≤ δ. This observation implies that
δ1 = δ and confirms Eq. (39) given the opposite inequal-
ity derived above.
Next, consider Eq. (40). Let δ1 = η(N, f,Ω) and
f1 = ζ(N, δ1,Ω). Then there exists a quantum state ρ
on H⊗(N+1) such that pρ = δ1 and fρ = f , which im-
plies that f1 = ζ(N, δ1,Ω) ≤ f . Meanwhile, there exists
a state ρ′ such that fρ′ = f1 and pρ′ = δ1, which im-
plies that η(N, f1,Ω) ≥ δ1 = η(N, f,Ω). Since η(N, δ,Ω)
is strictly increasing in f for 0 ≤ f ≤ 1 according to
Lemma 3, we conclude that f1 ≥ f . This observation
implies that f1 = f and confirms Eq. (40) given the op-
posite inequality derived above.
Proof of Lemma 5. Recall that ζ(N, δ,Ω) is convex and
nondecreasing in δ according to Lemma 3. In addition,
ζ(N, δ,Ω) is a piecewise-linear function of δ, and each
turning point is equal to ηk for some k ∈ SN at which
ζ(N, δ = ηk,Ω) = ζk (cf. Lemma 13 below). Here ηk
and ζk are shorthands for ηk(λ) and ζk(λ), respectively,
which are defined in Eq. (27). To prove Eq. (41a), it
suffices to prove the inequality ζk ≥ ζ(N − 1, ηk,Ω) for
each turning point.
If k1 = 0, then ζk = 0, which implies that ηk ≤ δc
according to Lemma 1, so that ζ(N − 1, ηk,Ω) = 0 ≤ ζk.
If k1 ≥ 1, let k′ = (k1 − 1, k2, . . . , kD). Then
ηk′,N−1 ≥ ηk, ζk′,N−1 ≤ ζk, (B16)
where ηk′,N−1 and ζk′,N−1 are given in Eq. (27) with N
replaced by N − 1 and k replaced by k′. In conjunction
with Lemma 3 we conclude that
ζ(N − 1, ηk,Ω) ≤ ζ(N − 1, ηk′,N−1,Ω) ≤ ζk′,N−1 ≤ ζk,
(B17)
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which implies Eq. (41a) as desired. If δ ≤ δc then we
have ζ(N, δ,Ω) = ζ(N−1, δ,Ω) = 0. If δ = 1 by contrast,
then ζ(N, δ,Ω) = ζ(N − 1, δ,Ω) = 1. So the inequality in
Eq. (41a) is saturated in both cases.
If the upper bound in Eq. (B17) is saturated, then
ζk′,N−1 = ζk, which implies that ζk = 0 (which means
ηk ≤ δc) or ζk = 1 (which means ηk = 1). So the upper
bound in Eq. (B17) cannot be saturated whenever the
turning point satisfies δc < ηk < 1. In conjunction with
Eqs. (32) and (33), this observation implies that the in-
equality in Eq. (41a) is saturated iff δ ≤ δc or δ = 1. Ac-
cording to Lemma 2, Eq. (41b) and Eq. (41a) are equiv-
alent, so the same conclusion also applies to Eq. (41b).
Equation (41c) and the equality condition can be
derived using a similar reasoning as presented above.
Equations (41d) and (41c) are equivalent according to
Lemma 2.
Alternatively, Eq. (41c) can be derived from Lemmas 1,
3, 4, and Eq. (41a). To be specific, if f = 0, then
η(N, f,Ω) < η(N − 1, f,Ω) according to Lemma 1, so
Eq. (41c) holds with strict inequality. If f > 0, then
η(N, f,Ω) > η(N, 0,Ω) = δc, (B18)
η(N − 1, f,Ω) > η(N − 1, 0,Ω) > δc, (B19)
according to Lemmas 1 and 3, where δc is given in
Eq. (31). In addition, Eq. (41a) and Lemma 4 implies
that
ζ(N, η(N − 1, f,Ω),Ω) ≥ ζ(N − 1, η(N − 1, f,Ω),Ω)
= f = ζ(N, η(N, f,Ω),Ω). (B20)
In conjunction with Lemma 3, this equation implies that
η(N, f,Ω) ≤ η(N − 1, f,Ω) (B21)
and confirms Eq. (41c). If the inequality in Eq. (41c) is
saturated, then the inequality in Eq. (B20) is saturated,
so that η(N − 1, f,Ω) ≤ δc or η(N − 1, f,Ω) = 1. The
first case cannot happen, while the second case holds iff
f = 1. Therefore, the inequality in Eq. (41c) is saturated
iff f = 1.
Proof of Lemma 6. Lemma 6 follows from the definition
of N(ǫ, δ,Ω) in Eq. (23) and the fact that the following
four inequalities are equivalent,
F (N, δ,Ω) ≥ 1− ǫ, (B22)
ζ(N, δ,Ω) ≥ δ(1− ǫ), (B23)
η(N, δ(1 − ǫ),Ω) ≤ δ, (B24)
F(N, δ(1 − ǫ),Ω) ≥ (1− ǫ). (B25)
Here the equivalence of the first two inequalities is a
corollary of Lemma 2; so is the equivalence of the last
two inequalities. The equivalence of the middle two in-
equalities follows from Lemmas 3 and 4, note that δ ≥ δc
if either inequality is satisfied.
By Eq. (38) in the main text, ζ(N, δ,Ω) and η(N, f,Ω)
are piecewise linear functions, whose turning points cor-
respond to the extremal points of the region RN,Ω, which
have the form (ηk(λ), ζk(λ)) for certain k ∈ SN . In
conjunction with the monotonicity and convexity (con-
cavity) of ζ(N, δ,Ω) (η(N, f,Ω)) stated in Lemma 3 (see
also Lemma 4), we can deduce the following conclusion.
Here δc is defined in Eq. (31).
Lemma 13. ζ(N, δ,Ω) for δc ≤ δ ≤ 1 and η(N, f,Ω)
for 0 ≤ f ≤ 1 can be expressed as follows,
ζ(N, δ,Ω) =
aj+1 − δ
aj+1 − aj bj +
δ − aj
aj+1 − aj bj+1, (B26)
η(N, f,Ω) =
bl+1 − f
bl+1 − bl al +
f − bl
bl+1 − bl al+1, (B27)
where j and l are chosen so that aj ≤ δ ≤ aj+1 and
bl ≤ f ≤ bl+1. Here aj = ηk(j)(λ) and bj = ζk(j)(λ) with
k(j) ∈ SN for j = 0, 1, . . . ,m, which satisfy the following
conditions
δc = a0 < a1 < . . . < am−1 < am = 1, (B28)
0 = b0 < b1 < . . . < bm−1 < bm = 1, (B29)
0 =
b0
a0
<
b1
a1
< . . . <
bm−1
am−1
<
bm
am
= 1. (B30)
If Ω is a nonsingular homogeneous strategy defined in
Eq. (45) for example, then δc = λ
N , m = N + 1, aj =
ηN+1−j(λ), and bj = ζN+1−j(λ); cf. Theorem 1 in the
main text.
Lemma 13 is very helpful to understanding the proper-
ties of ζ(N, δ,Ω) and η(N, f,Ω), although, in general, it
is not easy to determine the values of m, k(j), aj , and bj .
Geometrically, (aj , bj) happen to be the extremal points
of the region RN,Ω. When δc = τ
N , which can happen
iff τ = β > 0, RN,Ω has no other extremal point; when
δc > τ
N , RN,Ω has only one additional extremal point,
namely (τN , 0).
Appendix C: Homogeneous strategies
1. Auxiliary results on homogeneous strategies
Before proving the results on homogeneous strategies
presented in the main text, we need to introduce a few
auxiliary results. For j, k ∈ Z≥0, define
gjk(λ) = gkj(λ) :=
ζk(λ)− ζj(λ)
ηk(λ)− ηj(λ) , j 6= k, (C1)
gk(λ) := gk(k+1)(λ) =
ζk(λ)− ζk+1(λ)
ηk(λ)− ηk+1(λ) , (C2)
where ηk(λ) and ζk(λ) are defined in Eq. (48), assuming
that N is a positive integer. To simplify the notations,
we shall use ηk, ζk, gk, gkj as shorthands for ηk(λ), ζk(λ),
gk(λ), gkj(λ) if there is no danger of confusions.
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Lemma 14. Suppose 0 < λ < 1 and j, k ∈ Z≥0 with
k < j. Then gk(λ) decreases strictly monotonically with
k, and gkj(λ) decreases strictly monotonically with j, k.
Lemma 15. Let 0 ≤ λ < 1 and k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N + 1}.
Then
1
1− λN ≤
1− ζk(λ)
1− ηk(λ) ≤
1 +N(1− λ)
N(1− λ) =
1 +Nν
Nν
. (C3)
The first inequality is saturated iff k = N + 1, or k ≥ 2
and λ = 0; the second inequality is saturated iff k = 1.
Lemma 15 in particular implies that
1
1− λN <
1 +Nν
Nν
, λN <
1
Nν + 1
, (C4)
recall that N is a positive integer.
Lemma 16. Suppose 0 < λ < 1 and 0 < δ ≤ 1. Then
max
k∈Z≥0
ζ(N, δ, λ, k) = ζ(N, δ, λ, k∗), (C5)
max{0, ζ(N, δ, λ, k∗)}
= max{0, ζ(N, δ, λ, k+), ζ(N, δ, λ, k−)}. (C6)
where k∗ is the largest integer k that satisfies ηk ≥ δ,
k+ = ⌈logλ δ⌉, and k− = ⌊logλ δ⌋. In addition
ζ(N, δ, λ, k∗) ≤ 0, 0 ≤ δ ≤ λN , (C7)
ζ(N, δ, λ, k∗) > 0, λ
N < δ ≤ 1. (C8)
Lemma 17. Suppose 0 < ǫ, δ, λ < 1 and k ∈ Z≥0. Then
N˜(ǫ, δ, λ, k) > 0 and it decreases strictly monotonically
with ǫ and δ. If δ ≤ λk/(F+λǫ), then N˜(ǫ, δ, λ, k) > k−1.
Lemma 18. Suppose 0 < ǫ, δ, λ < 1. Then
N˜−(ǫ, δ, λ) ≤ Fν + λ
λǫ
k− +
logλ δ − k−
λǫ
=
logλ δ
λǫ
− νk−
λ
,
(C9)
where F = 1 − ǫ, ν = 1 − λ, and k− = ⌊logλ δ⌋. The
inequality is saturated when logλ δ is an integer.
Proof of Lemma 14. According to Eqs. (C1) and (C2) as
well as the definitions of ηk(λ) and ζk(λ) in Eq. (48), we
have
gk(λ) =
λ[1 + (N − k)ν]
ν(Nλ+ kν)
, (C10)
gk(λ)− gk+1(λ) = (N + 1)λ
[Nλ+ (k + 1)ν](Nλ + kν)
> 0,
(C11)
where ν = 1 − λ. So gk(λ) decreases strictly monotoni-
cally with k for k ∈ Z≥0.
Simple analysis shows that gkj(λ) can be expressed as
a weighted average of gm(λ) for m = k, k + 1, . . . , j − 1,
namely,
gkj(λ) =
j−1∑
m=k
ηm(λ)− ηm+1(λ)
ηk(λ)− ηj(λ) gm(λ), (C12)
where the weight for each gm(λ) is strictly positive. So
gj(λ) < gj−1(λ) < gkj(λ) < gk(λ) when k + 1 < j. In
addition, gk(j+1)(λ) is a convex sum of gkj(λ) and gj(λ),
that is,
gk(j+1) =
(ηk − ηj)gkj + (ηj − ηj+1)gj
ηk − ηj+1 , (C13)
which implies that gk(j+1)(λ) < gkj(λ); by the same to-
ken we can prove g(k+1)j(λ) < gkj(λ) when k + 1 < j.
Therefore, gkj(λ) decreases strictly monotonically with k
and j.
Proof of Lemma 15. When 0 < λ < 1, Lemma 15 is an
immediate consequence of Lemma 14 given that
η0(λ) = ζ0(λ) = 1, ηN+1(λ) = λ
N , ζN+1(λ) = 0, (C14)
η1(λ) =
1 +Nλ
N + 1
, ζ1(λ) =
Nλ
N + 1
, (C15)
so that
g0k(λ) =
1− ζk(λ)
1− ηk(λ) =
{
1+N(1−λ)
N(1−λ) k = 1,
1
1−λN k = N + 1.
(C16)
When λ = 0, we have ζ0 = η0 = 1, η1 = 1/(N + 1),
ηk = 0 for k = 2, 3, . . . , N + 1, and ζk = 0 for k =
1, 2, . . . , N + 1, in which case Lemma 15 can be verified
explicitly.
Proof of Lemma 16. By the definition of ζ(N, δ, λ, k) in
Eq. (54), we can derive
ζ(N, δ, λ, k)− ζ(N, δ, λ, k − 1)
=
λk[k + (N + 1− k)λ]− (N + 1)λδ
(kν +Nλ)[(k − 1)ν +Nλ] . (C17)
So ζ(N, δ, λ, k) ≥ ζ(N, δ, λ, k − 1) iff δ ≤ ηk and the
inequality is saturated only when δ = ηk. Therefore, the
maximum of ζ(N, δ, λ, k) over k ∈ Z≥0 is attained when k
is the largest integer that satisfies ηk ≥ δ, which confirms
Eq. (C5).
Before proving Eq. (C6), we first prove Eqs. (C7) and
(C8). According to Eq. (54) in the main text and the
definition of k∗, ζ(N, δ, λ, k∗) is a convex sum of ζk∗(λ)
and ζk∗+1(λ) in which the weight of ζk∗(λ) is nonzero.
If 0 < δ ≤ λN , then we have k∗ ≥ N + 1, which im-
plies that ζk∗(λ) ≤ 0 and ζk∗+1(λ) < 0. Therefore,
ζ(N, δ, λ, k∗) ≤ 0, which confirms Eq. (C7). Conversely,
if λN < δ ≤ 1, then k∗ ≤ N , which implies that
ζk∗(λ) > 0 and ζk∗+1(λ) ≥ 0. So ζ(N, δ, λ, k∗) > 0,
which confirms Eq. (C8).
Alternatively, to prove Eq. (C7), we can prove that
ζ(N, δ, λ, k) ≤ 0 for k ∈ Z≥0. Given that ζ(N, δ, λ, k) is
a linear function of δ, it suffices to prove the result when
δ = 0 and δ = λN . According to Eq. (54),
ζ(N, δ = 0, λ, k) = − λ
k+1
ν(kν +Nλ)
< 0, (C18)
30
where ν = 1− λ. In addition,
ζ(N, δ = λN , λ, k) =
λ{λN [1 + (N − k)ν]− λk}
ν(kν +Nλ)
. (C19)
To prove the inequality ζ(N, δ = λN , λ, k) ≤ 0, it suffices
to prove the following inequality
1 + j(1− λ) − λ−j ≤ 0, j ∈ Z, 0 < λ < 1. (C20)
This inequality can be verified by noting that the left-
hand side is equal to 0 when λ = 1 and that its derivative
over λ is nonnegative,
− j(1− λ−j−1) ≥ 0. (C21)
Therefore, ζ(N, δ = λN , λ, k) ≤ 0, which implies Eq. (C7)
given Eq. (C18).
Now we can prove Eq. (C6). If 0 < δ ≤ λN , then
the equality holds because both sides are equal to zero
according to Eq. (C7). On the other hand, if λN < δ ≤ 1,
then 0 ≤ k+ ≤ N and 0 ≤ k− ≤ N − 1; in addition,
ηk−(λ) ≥ δ and η1+k+(λ) < δ. Therefore, k∗ is equal to
either k+ or k−, so that
ζ(N, δ, λ, k∗) = max{ζ(N, δ, λ, k+), ζ(N, δ, λ, k−)},
(C22)
which confirms Eq. (C6).
Proof of Lemma 17. To prove Lemma 17, we first inves-
tigate the monotonicity of N˜(ǫ, δ, λ, k) defined in Eq. (63)
for 0 < ǫ, δ ≤ 1, 0 < λ < 1, and k ∈ Z≥0. The partial
derivative of N˜(ǫ, δ, λ, k) over ǫ reads
∂N˜(ǫ, δ, λ, k)
∂ǫ
= −λ
k+1 + δ(kν − λ)
λνδǫ2
≤ 0, (C23)
where the inequality is saturated iff k = 0 and δ = 1.
This conclusion is easy to verify when k = 0, given that
λk+1 + δ(kν − λ) = (1 − δ)λ ≥ 0. When k ≥ 1, the con-
clusion follows from the inequality λk+1+ δ(kν −λ) > 0,
which can be verified by analyzing the two extreme cases
δ = 0 and δ = 1; note that this inequality is well defined
even if δ = 0 although N˜(ǫ, δ, λ, k) is not. Therefore,
N˜(ǫ, δ, λ, k) is strictly decreasing in ǫ for 0 < ǫ ≤ 1 except
when k = 0 and δ = 1, in which case N˜(ǫ, δ, λ, k) = 0.
Next, the partial derivative of N˜(ǫ, δ, λ, k) over δ reads
∂N˜(ǫ, δ, λ, k)
∂δ
= − λ
k
νδ2ǫ
< 0. (C24)
So N˜(ǫ, δ, λ, k) is strictly decreasing in δ for 0 < δ ≤ 1.
According to the above analysis,
N˜(ǫ, δ, λ, k) ≥ N˜(ǫ = 1, δ = 1, λ, k)
=
λk + kν − 1
ν
≥ 0. (C25)
Here the first inequality is saturated iff ǫ = δ = 1, or
δ = 1 and k = 0; the second inequality is saturated iff
k = 0, 1. Therefore, N˜(ǫ, δ, λ, k) > 0, except when δ = 1
and k = 0, or ǫ = δ = k = 1. In particular, we have
N˜(ǫ, δ, λ, k) > 0 when 0 < ǫ, δ < 1.
Now suppose 0 < ǫ, δ < 1 and δ ≤ λk/(F + λǫ). If in
addition k = 0, then N˜(ǫ, δ, λ, k) > k according to the
above analysis. If k ≥ 1 and δ = λk/(F + λǫ), then
N˜(ǫ, δ, λ, k) = k − 1 + kF
λǫ
> k − 1. (C26)
Since N˜(ǫ, δ, λ, k) is monotonically deceasing in δ, we
have N˜(ǫ, δ, λ, k) > k− 1 whenever δ ≤ λk/(F +λǫ).
Proof of Lemma 18. The equality in Eq. (C9) can be ver-
ified by straightforward calculation given the equality
Fν + λ = 1− νǫ. According to Theorem 2,
N˜−(ǫ, δ, λ) =
k−ν
2δF + λk−+1 + λδ(k−ν − 1)
λνδǫ
=
Fν + λ
λǫ
k− +
λk−+1 − λδ
λνδǫ
=
Fν + λ
λǫ
k− +
λk−−logλ δ+1 − λ
λνǫ
. (C27)
To prove the inequality in Eq. (C9), it is equivalent to
prove the following inequality
λ1−a − λ− νa ≤ 0, (C28)
where a = logλ δ − ⌊logλ δ⌋, which satisfies 0 ≤ a < 1.
Equation (C28) holds because the function λ1−a−λ−νa
is convex in a and is equal to 0 when a = 0 and a = 1.
This observation completes the proof of Eq. (C9).
When logλ δ is an integer, we have a = 0, so the in-
equality in Eq. (C28) and that in (C9) are saturated.
2. Proofs of Theorems 1-3 and Eq. (73)
Proof of Theorem 1. According to Lemma 2, we have
F (N, δ, λ) = ζ(N, δ, λ)/δ, where ζ(N, δ, λ) = 0 if δ ≤
δc = λ
N . If δ ≥ λN , then
ζ(N, δ, λ) = min
0≤k<j≤N+1
(cjζj + ckζk), (C29)
where ζj , ζk are shorthands for ζj(λ), ζk(λ), and the pa-
rameters k, j are restricted by the requirements ηk ≥ δ
and ηj < δ. The coefficients cj , ck are determined by the
conditions
cj + ck = 1, cjηj + ckηk = δ, (C30)
which yield
cj =
ηk − δ
ηk − ηj , ck =
δ − ηj
ηk − ηj . (C31)
Therefore,
cjζj + ckζk =
ηk − δ
ηk − ηj ζj +
δ − ηj
ηk − ηj ζk
= ζj + gkj(δ − ηj) = ζk + gkj(δ − ηk), (C32)
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where gkj = gkj(λ) is defined in Eq. (C1).
If j > k + 1, then ηj−1 < δ or ηk+1 ≥ δ, so the value
of cjζj + ckζk does not increase if we replace j with j− 1
or k with k + 1 according to Lemma 14. Therefore, the
minimum in Eq. (C29) can be attained when j = k + 1
and ηk+1 < δ ≤ ηk, in which case k = k∗ is the largest
integer that satisfies the condition ηk ≥ δ. In addition
we have ck = ck(δ, λ) and cj = 1− ck(δ, λ), so that
cjζj + ckζk = ζ(N, δ, λ, k∗), (C33)
which confirms Eq. (55).
Proof of Theorem 2. By definition N(ǫ, δ, λ) is the min-
imum value of positive integer N under the condition
F (N, δ, λ) ≥ F with F = 1− ǫ, that is,
ζ(N, δ, λ) ≥ Fδ, (C34)
where Fδ > 0. According to Corollary 1 in the main
text, Eq. (C34) is equivalent to
max
k∈Z≥0
ζ(N, δ, λ, k) ≥ Fδ. (C35)
From the definition of ζ(N, δ, λ, k) in Eq. (54) we can
deduce that the inequality ζ(N, δ, λ, k) ≥ Fδ is satisfied
iff
N ≥ N˜(ǫ, δ, λ, k) = kν
2δF + λk+1 + λδ(kν − 1)
λνδǫ
. (C36)
So Eq. (C34) is satisfied iff
N ≥ min
k∈Z≥0
N˜(ǫ, δ, λ, k). (C37)
Therefore,
N(ǫ, δ, λ) =
⌈
min
k∈Z≥0
N˜(ǫ, δ, λ, k)
⌉
, (C38)
which confirms the first equality in Eq. (64).
Calculation shows that
N˜(ǫ, δ, λ, k)− N˜(ǫ, δ, λ, k − 1)
=
νδ(Fν + λ) + λk+1 − λk
λνδǫ
=
δ(F + λǫ)− λk
λδǫ
, (C39)
so N˜(ǫ, δ, λ, k) ≤ N˜(ǫ, δ, λ, k−1) iff δ ≤ λk/(F+λǫ). The
minimum in Eq. (C38) is attained when k is the largest
integer that satisfies δ ≤ λk/(F + λǫ), that is k = k∗.
Therefore, N(ǫ, δ, λ) = ⌈N˜(ǫ, δ, λ, k∗)⌉, which confirms
Eq. (64)
Alternatively, Eq. (C34) is satisfied iff
max
{
ζ(N, δ, λ, k+), ζ(N, δ, λ, k−)
} ≥ Fδ. (C40)
Note that
max
k∈Z≥0
ζ(N, δ, λ, k) = max
{
ζ(N, δ, λ, k+), ζ(N, δ, λ, k−)
}
(C41)
whenever one side of the equation is known to be positive
by Corollary 1 in the main text. Based on this observa-
tion, we can derive
N(ǫ, δ, λ) =
⌈
min{N˜+(ǫ, δ, λ), N˜−(ǫ, δ, λ)}
⌉
, (C42)
which confirms Eq. (66) and implies Eq. (67) given
Eq. (C39).
Proof of Eq. (73). The equality in Eq. (73) follows from
Theorem 2, note that
N˜(ǫ, δ, λ, 1) =
ν2δF + λ2 − λ2δ
λνδǫ
. (C43)
To prove the lower bound in Eq. (73), we first compute
the derivative of N˜(ǫ, δ, λ, 1) over λ, with the result
∂N˜(ǫ, δ, λ, 1)
∂λ
=
(1− δ)λ2 − δFν2
λ2ν2ǫδ
. (C44)
The minimum of N˜(ǫ, δ, λ, 1) over the interval 0 < λ < 1
is attained when λ/(1 − λ) =√δF/(1− δ), that is,
λ = λ∗ :=
√
δF√
1− δ +√δF . (C45)
Therefore,
N(ǫ, δ, λ) ≥ N˜(ǫ, δ, λ, 1) ≥ N˜(ǫ, δ, λ∗, 1) = 2
√
(1 − δ)F
ǫ
√
δ
,
(C46)
which confirms the lower bound in Eq. (73).
Proof of Theorem 3. Let N = k++
⌈k+F
λǫ
⌉
. According to
Corollary 3, we have
F (N, δ, λ) ≥ (N − k+)λ
k+ + (N − k+)λ =
⌈k+F
λǫ
⌉
λ
k+ +
⌈k+F
λǫ
⌉
λ
≥
k+F
ǫ
k+ +
k+F
ǫ
= F = 1− ǫ, (C47)
which implies that N(ǫ, δ, λ) ≤ N and confirms the upper
bound in Eq. (74).
Next, let N = k− +
⌈ k−F
λǫ
⌉
. If k− = 0, then we have
N = 0 < N(ǫ, δ, λ). If k− ≥ 1, then N − 1 ≥ k− ≥ 1. By
virtue of Corollary 3 we can deduce that
F (N − 1, δ, λ) ≤ (N − 1− k−)λ
k− + (N − 1− k−)λ
=
(⌈k−F
λǫ
⌉− 1)λ
k− +
(⌈k−F
λǫ
⌉− 1)λ <
k−F
ǫ
k− +
k−F
ǫ
= 1− ǫ, (C48)
which implies that N(ǫ, δ, λ) ≥ N and confirms the lower
bound in Eq. (74). If logλ δ is an integer, then k+ = k−,
so the lower bound and the upper bound in Eq. (74) co-
incide, which means both of them are saturated. Alter-
natively, this fact can be verified by virtue of Theorem 2.
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Finally, let us prove Eq. (75). According to Theorem 2
in the main text and Lemma 18,
N(ǫ, δ, λ) = ⌈min{N˜+(ǫ, δ, λ), N˜−(ǫ, δ, λ)}⌉
≤ ⌈N˜−(ǫ, δ, λ)⌉ ≤
⌈
logλ δ
λǫ
− νk−
λ
⌉
, (C49)
which confirms Eq. (75). If logλ δ is an integer, then
both inequalities are saturated, so the bound in Eq. (75)
is saturated.
Appendix D: Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. If the strategy Ω is homogeneous, then we have
ζ(N, δ,Ω) = ζ(N, δ, β), and Theorem 4 follows from
Proposition 2. In general Theorem 4 can be proved based
on Eq. (38) and the observation that ηk(λ)−ζk(λ) = 1/2
for all k ∈ S ∗1 whenever ζk(λ) 6= 0 given the assumption
N = 1. Geometrically, this fact means that all points
(ηk(λ), ζk(λ)) for k ∈ S ∗1 lie on two line segments.
To be specific, recall that ζ(N, δ,Ω) ≤ ζ(N, δ, β).
When β ≥ 1/2, Eq. (106) holds because the opposite
inequality ζ(N, δ,Ω) ≥ ζ(N, δ, β) also holds. In view of
Eq. (38), to verify this claim, it suffices to prove that
ζk(λ) ≥ ζ(N, δ = ηk(λ), β), ∀k ∈ S1. (D1)
The assumption k ∈ S1 means kj ≥ 0 and
∑
j kj = 2.
When k1 = 2, we have ζk(λ) = ηk(λ) = 1, so Eq. (D1)
holds. When k1 = 0, we have ζk(λ) = 0, while ηk(λ) ≤ β
according to Lemma 1, so ζ(N, δ = ηk(λ), β) = 0 and
Eq. (D1) also holds. When k1 = 1, according to Eq. (27),
we have
ηk(λ) =
1 + λj
2
, ζk(λ) =
λj
2
(D2)
for some 2 ≤ j ≤ D. If (1 + λj)/2 ≤ β, then we have
ζ(N, δ = ηk(λ), β) = 0 according to Eq. (95), so Eq. (D1)
holds. If (1 + λj)/2 ≥ β (note that λj ≤ β), then
ζk(λ)− ζ(N, δ = ηk(λ), β) = λj
2
− β(1 + λj − 2β)
2(1− β)
=
(2β − 1)(β − λj)
2(1− β) ≥ 0. (D3)
So Eq. (D1) holds, which implies ζ(N, δ,Ω) ≥ ζ(N, δ, β).
In conjunction with the opposite inequality, we conclude
that ζ(N, δ,Ω) = ζ(N, δ, β), which confirms Eq. (106).
Next, consider the case β < 1/2. If τ = β, then
Eq. (107) follows from Eq. (95). If τ < β, let Ω˜ be
a verification operator with three distinct eigenvalues,
1, β, τ (the eigenvalue 1 is nondegenerate); then we have
ζ(N, δ,Ω) ≤ ζ(N, δ, Ω˜). In addition, it is straightfor-
ward to verify Eq. (107) if Ω is replaced by Ω˜. To prove
Eq. (107), it suffices to prove that ζ(N, δ,Ω) ≥ ζ(N, δ, Ω˜).
In view of Eq. (38), it suffices to verify that
ζk(λ) ≥ ζ(N, δ = ηk(λ), Ω˜), ∀k ∈ S1. (D4)
When k1 = 2, we have ζk(λ) = ηk(λ) = 1, so Eq. (D4)
holds. When k1 = 0, we have ζk(λ) = 0 and ηk(λ) ≤ β,
so ζ(N, δ = ηk(λ), β) = 0 and Eq. (D4) also holds. When
k1 = 1, Eq. (D2) and the fact that τ ≤ λj ≤ β imply that
ζ(N, δ = ηk(λ), Ω˜) = λj/2 = ζk(λ), recall that Eq. (107)
holds if Ω is replaced by Ω˜. This observation confirms
Eq. (D4) and implies that ζ(N, δ,Ω) ≥ ζ(N, δ, Ω˜). In con-
junction with the opposite inequality, we conclude that
ζ(N, δ,Ω) = ζ(N, δ, Ω˜), which implies Eq. (107).
Appendix E: Proofs of Lemma 7 and Theorem 5
1. Main body of the proofs
Proof of Lemma 7. To prove the inequality in Eq. (113)
in the lemma, it suffices to find a state ρ on H⊗(N+1)
such that pρ = δ and
fρ = pρ − 1
N + 1
(E1)
for 1/(N+1) ≤ δ ≤ δ∗. Since pρ and fρ are linear in ρ, it
suffices to find such a state in the two cases δ = 1/(N+1)
and δ = δ∗, respectively. When δ = 1/(N + 1), we can
choose the state ρ = ρk with k = (N, 0, . . . , 0, 1), in which
case we have pρ = 1/(N + 1) and fρ = 0, so Eq. (E1)
holds as desired, note that Ω is singular by assumption,
which means τ = λD = 0.
In the case δ = δ∗, we can choose ρ = ρk1 , where
k1 := (N, 1, 0, . . . , 0). According to Eq. (27), we have
pρ = ηk1(λ) =
1 +Nβ
N + 1
=
1 +N(1− ν)
N + 1
= δ∗,
fρ = ζk1(λ) =
Nβ
N + 1
=
N(1− ν)
N + 1
.
(E2)
Therefore,
pρ − fρ = ηk1(λ)− ζk1(λ) =
1
N + 1
, (E3)
and Eq. (E1) holds again. This observation completes
the proof of Lemma 7.
Proof of Theorem 5. To prove the inequality in Eq. (114)
in the theorem, let ρ =
∑
k∈SN
ckρk. If pρ = 1, then we
have ck = δk,k0, where k0 := (N+1, 0, . . . , 0). Therefore,
Fρ = fρ = 1 and F (N, δ = 1,Ω) = 1, so Eq. (114) holds.
If 0 < pρ < 1, then ck0 < 1 and
1− pρ
1− fρ =
1−∑k∈SN ckηk(λ)
1−∑k∈SN ckζk(λ)
=
1− ck0 −
∑
k∈S ∗
N
ckηk(λ)
1 − ck0 −
∑
k∈S ∗
N
ckζk(λ)
=
1−∑k∈S ∗
N
c′kηk(λ)
1 −∑k∈S ∗
N
c′kζk(λ)
=
∑
k∈S ∗
N
c′k[1− ηk(λ)]∑
k∈S ∗
N
c′
k
[1− ζk(λ)] , (E4)
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where S ∗N := SN \ {k0} is the subset of SN without the
vector k0 := (N+1, 0, . . . , 0), and c
′
k := ck/(1−ck0) form
a probability distribution on S ∗N . By virtue of Lemma 20
below, we can deduce that
1− pρ
1− fρ ≥ mink∈S ∗N
1− ηk(λ)
1− ζk(λ) =
1− ηk1(λ)
1− ζk1(λ)
=
Nν
Nν + 1
,
(E5)
where k1 = (N, 1, 0, . . . , 0). Therefore,
fρ ≥ pρ − 1− pρ
Nν
, (E6)
so that
Fρ =
fρ
pρ
≥ 1− 1− pρ
Npρν
. (E7)
By the definition in Eq. (20c), we conclude that
F (N, δ,Ω) ≥ 1− 1− δ
Nδν
. (E8)
Incidentally, the above bound is negative and thus triv-
ial when δ ≤ βN since βN < 1/(Nν + 1) according to
Eq. (C4).
Now we show that the inequality in Eq. (114) [that is,
Eq. (E8)] is saturated when δ ≥ δ∗ = ηk1(λ). To this
end, it suffices to show that the inequality in Eq. (E6)
can be saturated when pρ ≥ ηk1(λ). When ck = δk,k0,
that is, ρ = ρk0 = (|Ψ〉〈Ψ|)⊗(N+1), we have pρ = 1 and
fρ = 1, so Eq. (E6) is saturated. When ck = δk,k1 , that
is, ρ = ρk1 , we have pρ = ηk1(λ) and fρ = ζk1(λ), so
Eq. (E6) is also saturated. Since both pρ and fρ are
linear in ρ, it follows that the inequality in Eq. (E6) can
be saturated by a convex combination of ρk0 and ρk1
whenever pρ ≥ ηk1(λ).
Next, we prove Eq. (115) when ν ≥ 1/2. To this end,
note that
pρ − fρ =
∑
k∈SN
ckηk(λ)−
∑
k∈SN
ckζk(λ)
=
∑
k∈SN
ck[ηk(λ)− ζk(λ)] ≤ 1
N + 1
, (E9)
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 19 below.
Therefore,
Fρ ≥ 1− 1
(N + 1)pρ
, (E10)
which implies that
F (N, δ,Ω) ≥ 1− 1
(N + 1)δ
(E11)
and confirms Eq. (115). If in addition Ω is singular and δ
satisfies 1/(N+1) ≤ δ ≤ δ∗, then this bound is saturated
according to Lemma 7.
2. Auxiliary lemmas
Lemma 19. ηk(λ)− ζk(λ) ≤ 1/(N +1) for all k ∈ SN
if ν(Ω) ≥ 1/2.
Proof. If k = k0, then ηk(λ) = ζk(λ) = 1, so we have
ηk(λ)− ζk(λ) = 0 ≤ 1/(N + 1). If k 6= k0, then
ηk(λ)− ζk(λ) =
∑
i≥2|ki≥1
ki
(N + 1)
λki−1i
∏
j 6=i|kj≥1
λ
kj
j
≤ N + 1− k1
N + 1
λN−k12 ≤
N + 1− k1
N + 1
(1
2
)N−k1 ≤ 1
N + 1
.
(E12)
Here the second inequality follows from the assumption
ν(Ω) ≥ 1/2, which means λ2 ≤ 1/2.
Define
ξk(λ) :=
1− ηk(λ)
1− ζk(λ) , k ∈ S
∗
N . (E13)
Lemma 20. For any k ∈ S ∗N , we have
Nν
Nν + 1
≤ ξk(λ) ≤ 1− τN , (E14)
where ν = 1−β with β = λ2 and τ = λD, assuming that
λ1 = 1 and λj are arranged in decreasing order.
The lower bound in Eq. (E14) can be expressed as
Nν
Nν + 1
=
1− ηk1(λ)
1− ζk1(λ)
, (E15)
where k1 := (N, 1, 0, . . . , 0).
Proof. Note that
∑
j kj = N + 1 and k1 ≤ N by the
assumption k ∈ S ∗N . According to Lemma 21 below,
ξk(λ) ≥ ξk(1, β, . . . , β) = ξ(k1,N−k1+1)(1, β)
=
1− ηN−k1+1(β)
1− ζN−k1+1(β)
≥ Nν
Nν + 1
, (E16)
where the second inequality follows from Lemma 15 in
Appendix C. Note that the definition of ξk(λ) (as well as
that of ηk(λ) and ζk(λ)) can be extended as long as k
and λ have the same number of components.
By the same token, we have
ξk(λ) ≤ ξk(1, τ, . . . , τ) = ξ(k1,N−k1+1)(1, τ)
=
1− ηN−k1+1(τ)
1 − ζN−k1+1(τ)
≤ 1− τN , (E17)
where the two inequalities follow from Lemma 21 and
Lemma 15, respectively.
Here it is instructive to take a look at the special sce-
nario in which ζk(λ) = 0 (cf. the proof of Lemma 1
in Appendix B), which means k1 = 0, or λi = 0 and
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ki ≥ 1 for some 2 ≤ i ≤ D. In the first case, we have
τN ≤ ηk(λ) ≤ βN , so that
ξk(λ) = 1− ηk(λ) ≤ 1− τN , (E18)
ξk(λ) ≥ 1− βN = 1− (1 − ν)N ≥ Nν
Nν + 1
. (E19)
In the second case, we have τ = 0 and
ηk(λ) =
kiλ
ki−1
i
N + 1
∏
j 6=i,kj>0
λ
kj
j ≤
1
N + 1
, (E20)
which implies that
ξk(λ) = 1− ηk(λ) ≤ 1 = 1− τN , (E21)
ξk(λ) ≥ N
N + 1
≥ Nν
Nν + 1
. (E22)
These results are compatible with Lemma 20 as expected.
Lemma 21. Suppose k = (k1, k2, . . . , km) is a sequence
of m ≥ 2 nonnegative integers that satisfies k1 ≤ N and∑
j kj = N + 1, where N is a positive integer. Let u,v
be two m-component vectors that satisfy 0 ≤ u ≤ v ≤ 1
and u1 = v1 = 1. Then we have ξk(u) ≥ ξk(v).
The inequality 0 ≤ u ≤ v ≤ 1 in the above lemma
means 0 ≤ uj ≤ vj ≤ 1 for each j = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
Proof. By the assumption 0 ≤ u ≤ v ≤ 1 and Eq. (27),
we have ζk(u) ≤ ζk(v) ≤ k1/(N + 1) < 1. According to
Eq. (E13), ξk(u) is continuous in u for 0 ≤ u ≤ 1. So it
suffices to prove the lemma in the case 0 < u ≤ v ≤ 1.
For j ≥ 2, calculation shows that
∂ηk(u)
∂uj
= θ
(
kj
uj
∑
i
ki
ui
− kj
u2j
)
,
∂ζk(u)
∂uj
= θ
k1kj
uj
,
(E23)
where θ :=
(∏
i u
ki
i
)
/(N + 1). These derivatives have
well-defined limits even when some components ui go to
zero; this fact would be clearer if we insert the expression
of θ and adopt lengthier expressions for these derivatives.
In addition,
∂ξk(u)
∂uj
= −θkjuj
∑
i>1
ki
ui
− θkj + θ2k1kj
(1 − θk1)2u2j
= −θkj [uj
∑
i>1,i6=j
ki
ui
+ (kj − 1) + θk1]
(1 − θk1)2u2j
≤ 0, (E24)
note that 1 − θk1 ≥ 1/(N + 1) > 0. The inequality
in Eq. (E24) is strict except when kj = 0, in which
case ξk(u) is independent of uj, so are ηk(u) and ζk(u).
Therefore, ξk(u) is nonincreasing in uj for j ≥ 2; in
other words, ξk(u) ≥ ξk(v) whenever 0 < u ≤ v ≤ 1
and u1 = v1 = 1. The condition 0 < u ≤ v ≤ 1 can be
relaxed to 0 ≤ u ≤ v ≤ 1 by continuity.
Appendix F: Proofs of Lemma 8 and Theorem 6
Before proving Lemma 8 and Theorem 6, wee need to
introduce a few auxiliary notations and results.
When Ω is positive definite, that is, τ(Ω) > 0, we can
extend the definition of ηk(λ) and ζk(λ) over k to the
convex hull of SN , denoted by S¯N , which is composed of
vectors k = (k1, k2, . . . , kD) that satisfy
∑D
j=1 kj = N+1
and kj ≥ 0 for j = 1, 2, . . .D. The following analogs of
ζ(N, δ,Ω) and η(N, δ,Ω) [cf. Eq. (38)] will play important
roles in proving Lemma 8 and Theorem 6. Define
ζ¯(N, δ,Ω):=


min
k∈S¯N
{
ζk(λ)
∣∣ηk(λ) = δ} δc ≤ δ ≤ 1,
0 0 ≤ δ ≤ δc;
(F1)
η¯(N, f,Ω):= max
k∈S¯N
{
ηk(λ)
∣∣ζk(λ) = f} 0 ≤ f ≤ 1, (F2)
where ηk(λ) and ζk(λ) are defined in Eq. (27), while δc
is defined in Eq. (31). By assumption all eigenvalues of
Ω are positive, that is, λj > 0 for j = 1, 2, . . . , D, so
ηk(λ) > 0 for all k ∈ S¯N .
Lemma 22. Suppose 0 ≤ δ, f ≤ 1 and Ω is positive
definite; then
ζ(N, δ,Ω) ≥ ζ¯(N, δ,Ω), (F3)
η(N, f,Ω) ≤ η¯(N, f,Ω). (F4)
Proof of Lemma 22. When δ satisfies 0 ≤ δ ≤ δc, we have
ζ¯(N, δ,Ω) = 0 ≤ ζ(N, δ,Ω) by definition, so Eq. (F3)
holds in this case.
When δ > δc, by Lemma 13 in Appendix B, we can
find two vectors q0,q1 ∈ SN such that η0 < δ ≤ η1
and ζ(N, δ,Ω) = c0ζ0 + c1ζ1, where ηj = ηqj (λ) and
ζj = ζqj (λ) for j = 0, 1; here c0 and c1 are nonnegative
coefficients determined by the requirements c0 + c1 = 1
and c0η0 + c1η1 = δ, that is,
c0 =
η1 − δ
η1 − η0 , c1 =
δ − η0
η1 − η0 . (F5)
If δ = η1, then Eq. (F3) holds because SN ∈ S¯N . So it
remains to consider the scenario η0 < δ < η1, in which
case we have 0 < c0, c1 < 1. Let Fj = ζj/ηj for j =
0, 1, then F0 < F1 by Lemma 13. Geometrically, the
point (δ, ζ(N, δ,Ω)) lies on the line segment that connects
the two end points (η0, ζ0) and (η1, ζ1), which has slope
(ζ1 − ζ0)/(η1 − η0).
For 0 ≤ t ≤ 1, let
k(t) = q0(1 − t) + q1t = q0 + (q1 − q0)t, (F6)
η(t) = ηk(t)(λ), ζ(t) = ζk(t)(λ), (F7)
F (t) =
ζ(t)
η(t)
=
k1(t)∑
j
kj(t)
λj
. (F8)
Note that k(t) ∈ S¯N for 0 ≤ t ≤ 1; in addition,
η(0) = η0, ζ(0) = ζ0, F (0) = F0, while η(1) = η1,
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ζ(1) = ζ1, F (1) = F1. So Eq. (F7) defines a parametric
curve (η(t), ζ(t)) that connects (η0, ζ0) and (η1, ζ1). Let
tδ be the smallest value of t such that η(t) = δ; then
ζ¯(N, δ,Ω) ≤ ζ(tδ). So Eq. (F3) would follow if we can
prove ζ(tδ) ≤ ζ(N, δ,Ω).
To achieve our goal, we shall prove that the parametric
curve (η(t), ζ(t)) for 0 ≤ t ≤ tδ lies below the line seg-
ment passing through the two points (η0, ζ0) and (η1, ζ1).
To this end, we need to analyze the convexity (or concav-
ity) property of the curve, which depends on the second
derivative
d2ζ(t)
dη(t)2
=
ζ′′(t)η′(t)− η′′(t)ζ′(t)
η′(t)3
. (F9)
Here the derivatives with respect to t can be computed
explicitly by virtue of Eq. (27), with the result
η′(t) =
dη(t)
dt
= η(t)
∑
j
(q1j − q0j) lnλj + θ(t)q1j − q0j
λj
= θ(t)
[η(t)
θ(t)
ln
θ1
θ0
+
(η1
θ1
− η0
θ0
)]
, (F10)
ζ′(t) =
dζ(t)
dt
= ζ(t)
∑
j
(q1j − q0j) lnλj + θ(t)(q11 − q01) = θ(t)
[
k1(t) ln
θ1
θ0
+ (q11 − q01)
]
, (F11)
η′′(t) =
d2η(t)
dt2
= θ(t)
(
ln
θ1
θ0
)[η(t)
θ(t)
ln
θ1
θ0
+ 2
(η1
θ1
− η0
θ0
)]
, (F12)
ζ′′(t) =
d2ζ(t)
dt2
= θ(t)
(
ln
θ1
θ0
)[
k1(t) ln
θ1
θ0
+ 2(q11 − q01)
]
, (F13)
where
θ(t) =
1
N + 1
∏
j
λ
kj(t)
j , θ0 = θ(t = 0) =
1
N + 1
∏
j
λ
q0j
j , θ1 = θ(t = 1) =
1
N + 1
∏
j
λ
q1j
j . (F14)
Note that
η(t) = θ(t)
∑
j
kj(t)
λj
, ζ(t) = θ(t)k1(t). (F15)
Therefore,
ζ′′(t)η′(t)− η′′(t)ζ′(t) = θ(t)2
(
ln
θ1
θ0
)2[
(q11 − q01)η(t)
θ(t)
−
(η1
θ1
− η0
θ0
)
k1(t)
]
= θ(t)2
(
ln
θ1
θ0
)2[
(q11 − q01)
∑
j
q0j + (q1j − q0j)t
λj
−
(η1
θ1
− η0
θ0
)
[q01 + (q11 − q01)t]
]
= θ(t)2
(
ln
θ1
θ0
)2(η0q11
θ0
− η1q01
θ1
)
= θ(t)2
(
ln
θ1
θ0
)2 η0η1
θ0θ1
(θ1q11
η1
− θ0q01
θ0
)
= θ(t)2
(
ln
θ1
θ0
)2 η0η1
θ0θ1
(F1 − F0) ≥ 0. (F16)
Here the inequality is strict except when θ1 = θ0, in
which case both η(t) and ζ(t) are linear functions of t.
So the derivative d
2ζ(t)
dη(t)2 has the same sign as η
′(t) unless
it is identically zero.
Note that η(t)/θ(t) is a linear function of t. So
η′(t)/θ(t) is linear and thus monotonic in t according to
Eq. (F10); actually, η′(t)/θ(t) is strictly monotonic in t
unless it is a positive constant. When t = 0, we have
η′(0) = η0
[
ln
θ1
θ0
+
(η1θ0
θ1η0
− 1
)]
> η0
[
ln
θ1
θ0
+
(θ0
θ1
− 1
)]
≥ 0. (F17)
Since θ(t) > 0, it follows that η′(t) has at most one zero
point in the interval 0 ≤ t ≤ 1. If η′(t) > 0 in this
interval, then d
2ζ(t)
dη(t)2 ≥ 0, so ζ(t) is a convex function of
η(t) for 0 ≤ t ≤ 1, and the parametric curve (η(t), ζ(t))
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lies below the line segment that connects the two points
(η0, ζ0) and (η1, ζ1), which implies Eq. (F3). Otherwise,
η′(t) has a unique zero point 0 < t2 ≤ 1. If t2 = 1,
the same conclusion holds. If t2 < 1, then η
′(t) > 0 for
0 ≤ t < t2 and η′(t) < 0 for t2 < t ≤ 1, which implies
that η(t2) > η1. So there exists a unique real number t3
that satisfies the conditions 0 < t3 < t2 and η(t3) = η1.
Note that ζ(t) is convex in η(t) for 0 ≤ t ≤ t3 and that
tδ < t3, where tδ is the smallest value of t such that
η(t) = δ. To prove Eq. (F3), it suffices to prove the
inequality ζ(t3) ≤ ζ1, that is, F (t3) ≤ F1.
To proceed, we compute the derivative of F (t) over t,
with the result
dF (t)
dt
=
θ(t)2
η(t)2
η0η1
θ0θ1
(F1 − F0) > 0. (F18)
This derivative can be derived either from Eq. (F8) or
from Eqs. (F10) and (F11). So F (t) increases monoton-
ically with t, which implies that F (t3) ≤ F (1) = F1 and
ζ(t3) ≤ ζ(1) = ζ1. This observation implies that the
parametric curve (η(t), ζ(t)) for 0 ≤ t ≤ t3 lies below the
line segment that connects the two points (η0, ζ0) and
(η1, ζ1), which confirms Eq. (F3).
Equation (F4) can be proved using a similar reasoning
used for proving Eq. (F3). When f = 0, we have
η¯(N, f,Ω) = max
k∈S¯N
{
ηk(λ)
∣∣ζk(λ) = 0}
≥ max
k∈SN
{
ηk(λ)
∣∣ζk(λ) = 0} = η(N, f,Ω), (F19)
which confirms Eq. (F4); here the inequality follows from
the fact that SN is contained in S¯N . When f > 0, we
can choose q0,q1 ∈ SN and define η0, ζ0, η1, ζ1, η(t), ζ(t)
in a similar way to the proof of Eq. (F3), but with the
requirement η0 < δ ≤ η1 replaced by ζ0 < f ≤ ζ1. Since
the case f = ζ1 is trivial, we can assume ζ0 < f < ζ1.
Equations (F6)-(F18) still apply. According to Eq. (F16)
and the following equation
d2η(t)
dζ(t)2
= −ζ
′′(t)η′(t)− η′′(t)ζ′(t)
ζ′(t)3
, (F20)
the derivative d
2η(t)
dζ(t)2 has the opposite sign to ζ
′(t) unless
it is identically zero .
When t = 0, we have
ζ′(0) = θ0
[
q01 ln
θ1
θ0
+ (q11 − q01)
]
≥ θ0
[
q01
(
1− θ0
θ1
)
+ (q11 − q01)
]
= θ0
q11θ1 − q01θ0
θ1
= θ0
ζ1 − ζ0
θ1
> 0. (F21)
In addition, θ(t) > 0, and ζ′(t)/θ(t) is a linear and
thus monotonic function of t according to Eq. (F11).
Therefore, ζ′(t) has at most one zero point in the in-
terval 0 ≤ t ≤ 1 as is the case for η′(t). Now Eq. (F4)
can be proved using a similar reasoning presented after
Eq. (F17), though “convex” is replaced by “concave”.
Lemma 23. Suppose 1 > x1 ≥ x2 ≥ · · · , xm > 0 and
c ≤ 0. Then
max
a1,a2,...,am≥0
{∑
j
aj
xj
∣∣∣∣∑
j
aj lnxj = c
}
=
c
y ln y
, (F22)
where y = x1 if x1 lnx
−1
1 ≤ xm lnx−1m and y = xm other-
wise.
Proof. The maximization in Eq. (F22) is a linear pro-
gramming in which the feasible region is defined by
the inequalities a1, a2, . . . , am ≥ 0 and the equality∑
j aj lnxj = c. If c = 0, then a1 = a2 · · · = am = 0, so
Eq. (F22) holds.
If c > 0, the maximum in Eq. (F22) can be attained at
one of the extremal points of the feasible region, which
have the form
aj =
c
lnxj
, xi = 0 i 6= j, j = 1, 2, . . . ,m. (F23)
Therefore,
max
a1,a2,...,am≥0
{∑
j
aj
xj
∣∣∣∣∑
j
aj lnxj = c
}
= max
j
c
xj lnxj
= max
{ c
x1 lnx1
,
c
xm lnxm
}
=
c
y ln y
. (F24)
Here the second equality follows from the assumption
1 > x1 ≥ x2 ≥ · · ·xm > 0 and the fact that the function
c/(x lnx) is convex in x, given that c is negative.
Now we are ready to prove Lemma 8.
Proof of Lemma 8. We shall first prove Eq. (123). Ac-
cording to Lemma 22,
F(N, f,Ω) = f
η(N, f,Ω)
≥ f
η¯(N, f,Ω)
= min
k∈S¯N |ζk(λ)=f
k1∑
j(kj/λj)
= min
k∈S¯N |ζk(λ)=f
k1
k1 +
∑D
j=2(kj/λj)
. (F25)
The condition ζk(λ) = f entails the following inequality,
f = ζk(λ) =
k1
N + 1
∏
j
λ
kj
j ≤
D∏
j=2
λ
kj
j ≤ βN+1−k1 , (F26)
which implies that N +1− k1 ≤ ln f/ lnβ = logβ f , that
is, k1 ≥ N + 1 − (ln f/ lnβ). In addition, the above
equation implies that 0 ≥∑Dj=2 kj lnλj ≥ ln f , which in
turn implies that
∑D
j=2(kj/λj) ≤ ln f/(β˜ ln β˜) in view of
Lemma 23. Therefore,
F(N, f,Ω) ≥ min
k∈S¯N |ζk(λ)=f
k1
k1 + (β˜ ln β˜)−1 ln f
≥ N + 1− (lnβ)
−1 ln f
N + 1− (lnβ)−1 ln f − h ln f , (F27)
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which confirms Eq. (123).
Next, let us prove Eq. (122). If δ ≤ βN , then we have
τδ ≤ βN+1 and N+1−(lnβ)−1 ln(τδ) ≤ 0, so the bound
in Eq. (122) is trivial. If δ > βN , then Lemma 22 implies
that
F (N, δ,Ω) =
ζ(N, δ,Ω)
δ
≥ ζ¯(N, δ,Ω)
δ
= min
k∈S¯N |ηk(λ)=δ
k1
k1 +
∑D
j=2(kj/λj)
. (F28)
The condition ηk(λ) = δ entails the following inequality,
τδ = τηk(λ) =
τ
N + 1
(∏
j
λ
kj
j
)(∑
j
kj
λj
)
≤
D∏
j=2
λ
kj
j
≤ βN+1−k1 . (F29)
Now, Eq. (122) can be proved using a similar reasoning
that leads to Eq. (F27), but with f replaced by τδ.
Proof of Theorem 6. Equation (126) follows from
Eq. (30) and Theorem 3 in the main text. The lower
bound in Eq. (127) follows from Eq. (126) given that
β˜ = β = λ2 or β˜ = τ = λD.
To prove the upper bound in Eq. (127), let f = Fδ
and
N =
⌈
hF ln f−1
ǫ
+
ln f
lnβ
− 1
⌉
; (F30)
then Lemma 8 implies that
F(N, f,Ω) ≥ N + 1− (lnβ)
−1 ln f
N + 1− (lnβ)−1 ln f − h ln f
≥ h(1− ǫ)ǫ
−1 ln f−1
h(1− ǫ)ǫ−1 ln f−1 − h ln f = 1− ǫ. (F31)
In conjunction with Lemma 6 this equation implies that
N(ǫ, δ,Ω) ≤ N , which confirms the first upper bound in
Eq. (127).
By definition, |β˜ ln β˜| ≤ |β lnβ| < | lnβ|, which implies
that h > |1/ lnβ|. Therefore,
N =
⌈
h(1− ǫ) ln f−1
ǫ
+
ln f
lnβ
− 1
⌉
≤
⌈
h ln f−1
ǫ
− 1
⌉
<
h ln(Fδ)−1
ǫ
, (F32)
which confirms the second upper bound in Eq. (127).
Equation (128) can be proved using a similar reasoning
used for proving the upper bounds in Eq. (127), but with
f replaced by τδ and F(N, f,Ω) replaced by F (N, δ,Ω).
Appendix G: Proofs of Lemmas 9-11
Proof of Lemma 9. By Eqs. (138) and (139) in the main
text, it is clear that p∗(ν, 1 − ν) is nondecreasing in ν,
and h∗(ν, 1−ν) is nonincreasing in ν. If 1−e−1 ≤ ν ≤ 1,
then
νh∗(ν, 1− ν) = eν ≥ e(1− e−1) = e− 1 > 1, (G1)
and νh∗(ν, 1− ν) is strictly increasing in ν. On the other
hand, if 0 < ν ≤ 1− e−1, then
νh∗(ν, 1− ν) = ν
[
(1− ν) ln(1− ν)−1]−1 > 1. (G2)
By computing the derivative of νh∗(ν, 1 − ν) over ν
[cf. Eq. (G5) below with p = 0] it is straightforward to
verify that νh∗(ν, 1−ν) is strictly increasing in ν. In con-
junction with Eq. (G1), we conclude that νh∗(ν, 1−ν) >
1 and it is strictly increasing in ν for 0 < ν ≤ 1. In
addition,
lim
ν→0
νh∗(ν, 1− ν) = lim
ν→0
ν
[
(1− ν) ln(1− ν)−1]−1 = 1.
(G3)
By definition
νh(p, ν, 1− ν) = ν(βp lnβ−1p )−1, (G4)
where βp = 1−ν+pν > 0. The derivative of νh(p, ν, 1−ν)
over ν reads
d
dν
(
ν
βp lnβ
−1
p
)
= − (1− p)ν + ln(1− ν + pν)
[(1− ν + pν) ln(1− ν + pν)]2 > 0,
(G5)
where the last inequality follows from the simple fact that
ln(1 + x) < x when x > −1 and x 6= 0. Incidentally, the
derivative in Eq. (G5) approaches 1/2 in the limit ν → 0.
Therefore, νh(p, ν, 1−ν) increases strictly monotonically
with ν.
Proof of Lemma 10. We shall prove the seven statements
of Lemma 10 in the order 1, 6, 2; 3, 4; 7, 5.
Recall that p∗(ν, τ) is the smallest value of p ≥ 0
that satisfies βp ≥ 1/e and τp ln τ−1p ≥ βp lnβ−1p ; see
Eq. (137). Let q = p∗(ν, τ); then 0 ≤ q < 1. Sup-
pose 0 < ν′ ≤ ν and let β′ = 1 − ν′. Then we have
1 > β′ ≥ β ≥ 0 and 1 > β′q ≥ βq ≥ 1/e, so that
β′q lnβ
′
q
−1 ≤ βq lnβ−1q ≤ τq ln τ−1q , (G6)
which implies that p∗(ν
′, τ) ≤ q = p∗(ν, τ), that is,
p∗(ν, τ) is nondecreasing in ν.
In addition, we have τp ≤ βp ≤ β′p, which implies that
βp lnβp
−1 ≥ min{β′p lnβ′p−1, τp ln τ−1p } (G7)
and that
h(p, ν′, τ) =
[
min
{
β′p lnβ
′
p
−1
, τp ln τ
−1
p
}]−1
≥ [min{βp lnβ−1p , τp ln τ−1p }]−1 = h(p, ν, τ). (G8)
So h(p, ν, τ) is nonincreasing in ν. When p = p∗(ν
′, τ),
the above equation implies that
h∗(ν
′, τ) = h(p, ν′, τ) ≥ h(p, ν, τ) ≥ h∗(ν, τ). (G9)
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So h∗(ν, τ) is also nonincreasing in ν.
Next, suppose τ ≤ τ ′ ≤ β. Then we have τq ≤ τ ′q ≤ βq,
βq ≥ 1/e, and
τ ′q ln τ
′
q
−1 ≥ min{βq lnβ−1q , τq, ln τ−1q } = βq lnβ−1q ,
(G10)
which implies that p∗(ν, τ
′) ≤ q = p∗(ν, τ). Therefore,
p∗(ν, τ) is nonincreasing in τ , which confirms statement 1
of Lemma 10 given that p∗(ν, τ) is nondecreasing in ν as
shown above.
In addition, τp ≤ τ ′p ≤ βp, which implies that
τ ′p ln τ
′
p
−1 ≥ min{βp lnβp−1, τp ln τ−1p } (G11)
and that
h(p, ν, τ ′) =
[
min
{
βp lnβp
−1, τ ′p ln τ
′
p
−1}]−1
≤ [min{βp lnβ−1p , τp ln τ−1p }]−1 = h(p, ν, τ). (G12)
So h(p, ν, τ) is nonincreasing in τ , which confirms state-
ment 6 of Lemma 10 in view of the above conclusion.
When p = p∗(ν, τ), Eq. (G12) implies
h∗(ν, τ) = h(p, ν, τ) ≥ h(p, ν, τ ′) ≥ h∗(ν, τ ′). (G13)
So h∗(ν, τ) is also nonincreasing in τ , which confirms
statement 2 of Lemma 10.
Next, consider statements 3 and 4 in Lemma 10. By
Lemma 9 and statement 2 in Lemma 10 proved above,
we have νh∗(ν, τ) ≥ νh∗(ν, 1 − ν) > 1, which confirms
statement 3 in Lemma 10. In addition,
lim
ν→0
νh∗(ν, τ) ≥ lim
ν→0
νh∗(ν, 1− ν) = 1, (G14)
lim
ν→0
νh∗(ν, τ) ≤ lim
ν→0
νh(ν, ν, τ) = 1, (G15)
which implies that limν→0 νh∗(ν, τ) = 1 and confirms
statement 4 in Lemma 10.
Finally, we can prove statements 7 and 5 in Lemma 10.
By definition
νh(p, ν, τ) = max
{
ν
(
βp lnβ
−1
p
)−1
, ν
(
τp ln τ
−1
p
)−1}
,
(G16)
where βp = 1 − ν + pν. It is clear that ν
(
τp ln τ
−1
p
)−1
increases strictly monotonically with ν. The same con-
clusion holds for ν
(
βp lnβ
−1
p
)−1
according to the deriva-
tive in Eq. (G5). Therefore, νh(p, ν, τ) increases strictly
monotonically with ν, which confirms statement 7 in
Lemma 10.
Suppose 0 < ν′ < ν ≤ 1. Let p = p∗(ν, τ); note that
p > 0 if τ = 0, so that τp > 0. Therefore,
ν′h∗(ν
′, τ) ≤ ν′h(p, ν′, τ) < νh(p, ν, τ) = νh∗(ν, τ).
(G17)
So νh∗(ν, τ) increases strictly monotonically with ν,
which confirms statement 5 in Lemma 10.
Proof of Lemma 11. By definition, we have
h(ν/e, ν) =
[
min
{
βp0 lnβ
−1
p0 ,
ν
e
ln
e
ν
}]−1
, (G18)
νh(ν/e, ν) = max
{
ν
(
βp0 lnβ
−1
p0
)−1
, e
(
ln
e
ν
)−1}
, (G19)
where p0 = ν/e and βp0 = 1−ν+(ν2/e). As ν increases to
1, βp0 decreases monotonically to 1/e, while ν/e increases
monotonically to 1/e. So h(ν/e, ν) decreases monotoni-
cally with ν.
Next, let us consider the monotonicity of νh(ν/e, ν).
Note that e
(
ln eν
)−1
increases monotonically with ν. In
addition,
d[ν(βp0 lnβ
−1
p0 )
−1]
dν
=
eβp0 − (e− ν2) lnβp0
eβ2p0(lnβp0)
2
. (G20)
It is clear that the denominator is positive. The numer-
ator is also positive according to the following equation.
eβp0 − (e− ν2) lnβp0
= e− eν + ν2 − (e− ν2) ln(e− eν + ν2)
≥ e− eν + ν2 − (e− ν2)(1 − ν)
= (2− ν)ν2 ≥ 0. (G21)
Here the first inequality follows from the inequality below
ln(e− eν + ν2) ≤ 1− ν, (G22)
which can be proved by inspecting the derivative. There-
fore, both ν(βp0 ln τ
−1
p0 )
−1 and e
(
ln eν
)−1
increase mono-
tonically with ν, which implies that νh(ν/e, ν) increases
monotonically with ν.
Now, we are ready to prove Eq. (147). The first in-
equality there follows from the definition. To prove the
rest inequalities, note that
lnβ−1p0 = − ln(1− ν + e−1ν2) ≥ ν, (G23)
βp0 lnβ
−1
p0 ≥ (1 − ν + e−1ν2)ν (G24)
by Eq. (G22). In addition, it is straightforward to verify
p0 ln(p
−1
0 ) =
ν
e
ln
e
ν
≥ (1− ν + e−1ν2)ν. (G25)
Therefore,
νh(p0, ν, τ) ≤ (1−ν+e−1ν2)−1 ≤ 1+(e−1)ν ≤ e, (G26)
which confirms Eq. (147) in Lemma 11. Here the second
inequality follows from the inequality below
(1− ν + e−1ν2)[1 + (e− 1)ν]
= 1 + e−1ν(1 − ν)(e2 − 2e + ν − eν) ≥ 1, (G27)
given that 0 < ν ≤ 1.
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Appendix H: Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. First consider the bipartite case, let |Ψ〉 be any
bipartite entangled state shared between Alice and Bob.
Suppose on the contrary that |Ψ〉 can be verified by a
strategy Ω for which Alice performs only one projective
measurement. Without loss of generality, we may assume
that this is a complete projective measurement associated
with an orthonormal basis, say {|ϕ1〉, |ϕ2〉, . . . , |ϕd〉},
where d is the dimension of the Hilbert space of Alice.
Let Pk = |ϕk〉〈ϕk| be the corresponding rank-1 projec-
tors. Then any test operator necessarily has the form
E =
∑d
k=1 Pk ⊗ Qk, where Qk is a positive operator on
the Hilbert space of Bob that satisfies 0 ≤ Qk ≤ 1. To
ensure that the target state can always pass the test, E
must satisfy the condition 〈Ψ|E|Ψ〉 = 1.
Let |ψ˜k〉 = 〈ϕk|Ψ〉 be the unnormalized reduced state
of Bob when Alice obtains outcome k and pk = 〈ψ˜k|ψ˜k〉
the corresponding probability. Let |ψk〉 = |ψ˜k〉/√pk
when pk > 0. Then
〈Ψ|E|Ψ〉 =
∑
k
〈ψ˜k|Qk|ψ˜k〉 ≤
∑
k
〈ψ˜k|ψ˜k〉 =
∑
k
pk = 1.
(H1)
By assumption, this inequality is saturated, which im-
plies that 〈ψk|Qk|ψk〉 = 1 whenever pk > 0. So all kets
|ϕk〉⊗|ψk〉 with pk > 0 belong to the pass eigenspace (cor-
responding to the eigenvalue 1) of each test operator E
and thus the pass eigenspace of Ω. Note that the number
of outcomes with pk > 0 is at least equal to the Schmidt
rank of |Ψ〉. So the dimension of the pass eigenspace of
Ω is not smaller than the Schmidt rank of |Ψ〉; in partic-
ular, it is not smaller than 2 given that |Ψ〉 is entangled.
Therefore, |Ψ〉 cannot be verified if Alice performs only
one projective measurement; the same conclusion holds
if Bob performs only one projective measurement.
In general the proposition follows from the fact that
a multipartite state is also a bipartite state between one
party and the other parties.
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